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The local appropriation of democracy:  
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Thomas Bierschenk2 
 
This paper – an ethnographic account of the recent (2002/03) municipal elections in Para-
kou, the third-largest city in the Republic of Benin – can be read from different perspec-
tives. On one level, it is an empirical test of the claims frequently formulated by devel-
opment aid donors with respect to the potential of democratisation and decentralization 
for political mobilisation and development. On another level and against the backdrop of 
the extensive political science literature on democratic transformation in Africa and else-
where, it presents arguments for taking the local level more systematically into account 
when creating typologies of “democracies with an adjective” (a at present seemingly fa-
vourite past-time of the comparative branch of political science). From a more anthropo-
logical perspective, it is a description of how a global technology – democratic elections – 
is appropriated at local level: in this sense, the paper is about the local meanings of elec-
tions in a specific West African context. And, finally, in terms of a local Beninese con-
text, it tells the story of the emergence of a new type of businessman politician, a kind of 
West African variant of the Berlusconi phenomenon which is unfolding in Beninese poli-
tics.  
The paper analyses “just one particular case”, which may be a source of irritation 
for some political scientists. However, it is just not any case but one set in the Republic 
Benin, widely regarded as one of Africa’s few model democracies, and in its third-largest 
city. 
                                                 
1 Initial drafts of this paper were presented at the AEGIS Conference on “How people elect their leaders. 
Parties, party systems and elections in Africa south of the Sahara”, in Hamburg 22 and 23 May 2003, and at 
the Max-Planck-Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle on 30 June 2003. I am grateful to Andreas 
Mehler for inviting me to the Hamburg conference, and to Galilou Abdoulaye, Agnès Badou, Nassirou 
Bako-Arifari, Gero Erdmann and Dirk Kohnert for helpful comments made during the revision of these 
drafts. The research in Parakou is part of an on-going, long-term research project on social history and re-
gime changes in Parakou since the 1950s. (For previous, related publications, see Bierschenk 1993a, 2000; 
for work on the wider national political context, cf. Bierschenk 1993b, Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 
1998, Le Meur, Bierschenk & Floquet 1999, Bierschenk et al. 2000 ; for research on politics in Parakou 
supervised by the author, see Badou 2004, Braun 2004, Imorou 1998/99). I am grateful to the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for financing the underlying research on the municipal elections (cf. 
www.dfg.de/gepris/nachweise/244505.htm) which was carried out with the help of Agnès Badou, Mazou 
Issa and Tamimou Abdoulaye. We conducted around 50 interviews with major political actors in Parakou, 
before, in between and after the elections, including all municipal councillors with the notable exception of 
Rachidi Gbadamassi, e.g. the mayor, who proved too evasive despite our constant efforts to pin him down. 
Events were recorded up to November 2003. A larger version of this paper, including an annex with more 
details on the sociological profile of Parakou's municipal councillors, was published as Working Paper no. 
39 of the Department of Anthropology and African Studies, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz 
(http://www.uni-mainz.de/~ifeas/workingpapers/LocalParakou.pdf) 




1. Democratisation and decentralization in Africa: why history and the local level 
matter 
Donors have increasingly argued increasingly in recent years that developing countries 
can create favourable conditions for economic development and democratic governance 
by decentralizing their government structures: the institution of a representative political 
system at local level, it is claimed, would open up political arenas for new actors and 
would generate greater legitimacy for local political leaders, who will in turn mobilize 
local resources for development. In other words, it is suggested that there is an intrinsic 
link between popular participation at local level, better government at local level and the 
mobilization of potential for local development which is believed to have been stifled 
hitherto by the rigid control exercised by centralized bureaucracies (EDI 1989; KAS 
1992; BMZ 2002: 5; DIE 2002). 
This widely shared optimism of donors is, however, not shared by results of the 
relatively sparse empirical studies on the subject. In fact, already some 40 years ago Lu-
cas (1963),  in his evaluation of 16 years of local government in the former British parts 
of Africa, wrote: “The contribution of Local Authorities to national economic develop-
ment has been very slight”. This general scepticism on the part of the social scientist has 
not changed a great deal over time. In a comparative study of four Asian and African 
countries, Crook and Manor (1995: 330) concluded that “The claim that (decentralization) 
will lead to better performance, particularly in the formulation and implementation of 
locally oriented development policies, has to be treated with some caution”, and go on to 
say that “The conditions under which it can be successfully established and perform in 
accordance with the expectations placed upon it are complex, demanding and not often 
found, at least in the developing world”. 
Lucas’s 1963 evaluation of local government in Africa reminds us of a fact that is 
often neglected in the discussions surrounding the recent wave of democratisation and 
decentralization in Africa: these are not new phenomena. Decentralization was propa-
gated by the colonial powers, particularly Britain when it was preparing to grant inde-
pendence to its colonies from 1947 onwards. Indeed, Olowu (2001) identifies four differ-
ent phases of decentralization experienced on the African continent since the 1940s. 
While his scheme for the classification of the phases of decentralization has a temporal 
dimension, the major distinguishing feature of these phases is the forces that catalyzed the 
reforms. The latest phase, which Oluwu traces back to the early 1990s, is driven by the 
processes of political liberalization and democratisation.  
A similar kind of historical amnesia characterizes the ongoing debate on democ-
ratic transition in Africa. It is often forgotten that most African countries encountered 
democracy, political parties and elections intensively for the first time in the 1950s. This 
historical shortlivedness may be one of the reasons why, in general, even relatively com-
plex development models, like Bratton & van der Walle’s (1994) much-cited one, proved 
to have so little prognostic force and fails to explain, for example, the success of democ-
racy in both Mali and Benin.3 One weakness of the Bratton & van der Walle (1994) 
                                                 
3 The national political regimes in both countries prior to 1989 were not of the competitive one-party system 
type, which according to Bratton & van der Walle’s classification (1994: 484ff.) provides the best precondi-
tions for democratic transition. Sandbrook (1996: 81) ranks Mali “among the least likely prospects for dura-
ble democracy in the world”. He does not see this, however, as a negation of his initial theses (one of which 
states that only stable two-party systems represent long-term democracy), but refers to ... “human agency” 
(!) (p. 85). It would appear that a consistent application of an institutional approach to empirical research on 
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model lies in the fact that while they base their typology on a historical perspective, they 
limit their study -- unlike Barrington Moore (1966) to whom they refer -- to the regime 
that existed immediately before the phase of democratic transition (i.e., in the case of Be-
nin, the period between 1972 and 1989). In my view, a more plausible assumption is that 
the current phase of democratisation is not only influenced by the nature of the immedi-
ately preceding regime, but that political lines of development are continued that originate 
from early independence, colonial rule and even the pre-colonial period.4 
Furthermore, even if they are as complex and historicizing in their approach as 
Bratton & van der Walle’s (1994) model, many political science typologies suffer from 
their systematic neglect of the local level. It would, indeed, be surprising if the local po-
litical situation did not display a high level of autonomy, particularly in the case of re-
gimes characterized by low steering capacity on the part of the central state.5 It has actu-
ally been demonstrated for Benin that local political developments are not simply a reflec-
tion of “major” national politics, but that local political history modulates national history 
to a large extent (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 1998, similarly for Mali, cf. Fay 2000). 
Thus, to relate this general statement to the issue under discussion here, in Benin the local 
forms of politics that existed during the phase of Marxist-Leninist rule were far more 
“competitive” than Bratton and Van de Walle’s classification of the national regime under 
the “plebiscitary single-party rule” type will reveal. Paradoxically, many village inhabi-
tants in Dahomey/Benin first experienced democratic forms of politics, and elections in 
particular, in the context of Marxist-Leninist single-party rule. At the risk of simplifying 
things somewhat, it might be said that the fate of democratic processes at national and 
local level since the 1950s in Benin has been almost inverted: at the local – urban – level, 
democratic procedures were introduced during the late colonial period, while the first 
years of independence saw their rapid abolition, as was the case throughout Africa. And 
while the regime that came to power in 1972 quickly adopted a Marxist-Leninist orienta-
tion, democratic elements were (re)introduced on the local level, whereas the “democratic 
renewal” regime did not hold any local elections between 1991 and 2002. 
Against this historical background, the purpose of this paper is to provide a very 
early analysis of the local elections which were held in Benin in late 2002/early 2003, 
twelve years after Benin’s change from a Marxist-Leninist to a multi-party democratic 
state. Since this “democratic renewal” (as the regime change of 1989/90 is referred to 
locally), Benin has been widely regarded as a model democracy in the African context. 
The holding of local elections -- resulting from extensive pressure from donors (in par-
ticular France and Germany) -- can be regarded as the rounding off of this transition to-
wards democracy. As we have seen, donors have high expectations of decentralization 
and local democracy. It is argued, in particular, that the institution of a representative po-
litical system at local level will open up political arenas for new actors and will generate 
greater legitimacy for local political leaders who will in turn be enabled to mobilize local 
resources for development. This paper tries to gauge whether these expectations have 
been fulfilled by taking Parakou, Benin’s third-largest city, as its main empirical case.  
                                                                                                                                                  
African democracies is not possible without repeated resort to the level of ad hoc explanation in terms of 
actors’ choices. 
4 In  his impressive detailed study of a Malian cercle, Fay (2000) recently demonstrated how productive it 
can be to view political developments from a long-term perspective. 
5 Karnoouh’s  (1973) social-anthropological study demonstrates that the local regimes also display a high 
level of internal logic in West-European political systems. 
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At this point in time, it is clearly far too early to provide a final assessment as re-
gards the effect of democratic decentralization on the city’s municipal political regime. 
The scope of this section shall, therefore, be limited to providing responses to the follow-
ing three questions which arise from some of the major expectations of donors with re-
spect to democratic decentralization and which were already referred to in the first part of 
this paper. The first two question concern democratisation as such and the third concerns 
the supposed link between local democracy and economic development: 
• Firstly, has the political system become more representative? Have political arenas 
been opened which were previously closed?  
• Secondly, have democratic rules of the political game replaced, or at least pushed 
into the background, pre-existing modes of political practice? In particular, have 
elections been able to contain the “negotiatory mode” which was so characteristic 
of political life in the city prior to 2003? 
• Thirdly, has local democracy led to an increased degree of local resource mobili-
zation, or – at least – an increased awareness among the local political elite of its 
necessity? Has local democracy thus replaced the prevailing logic of rent-seeking 
for the financing of public goods? 
As we shall see, the answer to the first two questions is “yes, but only to a very 
limited extent,” while the answer to the third question is “not at all so far”. As we shall 
also see, three major reasons for the – so far – limited success of democratic decentraliza-
tion can be identified in the unusual system of municipal election adopted in Benin, in the 
absence of inner-party democracy, and in the context of the prevailing practices for the 
financing of political parties. 
The paper argues that, while it is far too early to draw any conclusions about the 
long-term effects of regime change, and while decentralization as such was imposed by 
the international donors, the exact forms it has taken have tended to follow national and 
local political Beninese rationales. The electoral system has produced municipal councils 
which at best represent only 60% of the local population and which, in all cases, are 
dominated by a single  political party or party alliance, often representing not more than a 
quarter of the population. Thus, local democracy reflects, and has reinforced a particular 
characteristic of Beninese democracy. Benin is often admired for its multi-party democ-
racy, whereas in other equally democratic countries like Mali a tendency towards a de-
mocratic single-party system can be observed. In fact, multi-partyism “Benin style” is 
composed of a limited number of political parties which are each dominant in a given 
region and which now completely dominate one or the other of the municipal councils. 
Furthermore, far from “making democracy the only political game in town”, the 
introduction of local elections has so far not fundamentally reversed the dominant mode 
of doing politics in town, which is essentially a complex game of multi-level negociations 
between segments of the local elites and local representatives of the central state (Bier-
schenk 2000). Decentralisation has only changed the context in which these negotiations 
take place; also, it has added to the predominant currency of politics (e.g., negotiations) 
an additional – new - currency for “buying” into political power, e.g. three elections at 
strictly circumscribed points in the process of acceding to power positions. 
Sociologically speaking, the newly elected local councils are dominated by young-
ish businessmen who were the only people in a position to financially invest in election 
campaigns. In this respect, political developments in Benin seem to catch up with devel-
opments elsewhere in the region, in particular Nigeria and Ghana, where businessmen 
 5
have been prominent in politics for some time. In the Benin case, this can indeed be con-
sidered as a rejuvenation and renewal of (local) political elites. However, the case of Para-
kou shows that newcomers only have a chance to rise to the top (the mayorship) if they 
are supported by national political elite networks.6 Furthermore, the fact that these busi-
nessmen essentially depend on state contracts augurs badly for any hope there may be of 
controlling the rampant corruption and neopatrimonialism that exists in Benin (see the 
text on Benin by Bako-Arifari in Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2001).  
Finally, an analysis of the election campaign shows that local political leaders and 
the electorate consider decentralization not so much as an opportunity to mobilize local 
resources for development, but as an opportunity to mobilize external resources (e.g. de-
velopment aid). Like the “democratic renewal” of 1989/90, the installation of local de-
mocracy is seen by Benin’s political class as an additional opportunity for “rent seeking”. 
2. The national context: The Republic of Benin since 1990: a model democracy? 
Benin is often cited as a model democracy in the African context. Since the peace-
ful regime change of 1989/90, which is referred to locally as the “democratic renewal” 
(renouvau démocratique), presidential and parliamentary elections have been fair and 
free. The country enjoys free and dynamic media (over 57 private and government news-
papers, 42 private and two government radio stations and two national television channels 
in addition to the foreign channels accessible via satellite). The Constitutional Court has 
played its role as guardian of the Constitution admirably and the country has no political 
prisoners. Benin has also been spared major outbursts of ethnic-regionalist and social vio-
lence since 1991. Between 1990 and 2000, Benin was rated 2 for political freedom, be-
tween 2 and 3 for civil liberties and 2.0 on the combined index by Freedom House.7 In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, only South Africa (1 and 2, combined 1.5) has better ratings and 
only Botswana, Ghana, Mali and Namibia have comparable ones (omitting the islands of 
Cape Verde and Mauritius). Thus, Benin ranks among the “free” nations in the world 
which, in view of a regional context that is far from positive in this respect, must be ac-
knowledged as a major achievement on the part of the country’s political elite. 
No comprehensive study exists which evaluates Benin's democratisation record after 1990 
(for a brief overview, see Bierschenk et al. 2002: 4-16). There can be no doubt, however, 
that the institutionalisation of a pluralist democracy and the rule of law (état de droit) 
triggered by the “democratic renewal” have remained incomplete in many important re-
spects. At the level of formal politics, the national political system is extremely biased in 
favour of the executive and, in particular, the President. Parliament and its 83 members 
                                                 
6 while in Cotonou and Porto Novo, two members of the old political guards were elected mayor. 
7 The scale goes from 1 to 7 for both “political freedom” and “civil liberties” (see “Freedom in the World”, 
www.freedomhouse.org, updated 19.7.2002). Between 1972 and 1989, Benin’s rating for both categories 
had been the worst possible, i.e. 7 and 7 (the same as Iraq). In 2001, Benin’s rating dropped from 2 to 3 for 
political liberties; the reason given for this in the Freedom House country report was that the second round 
of the presidential election was boycotted by two major candidates. Any regular observer of the country will 
find the claim that the president then had to run against an “obscure fourth-place candidate” mysterious, to 
say the least, as the person in question, Bruno Amoussou, has been one of the country’s main political ac-
tors for years and is among the most likely successors to President Kérékou after 2006. The report also 
contains other factual errors such as the claim that the economy is “mixed-statist” (in fact, all of the state 
companies have been privatized) and that its “economy is based largely on subsistence agriculture”, which, 
apart from contradicting the “mixed-statist” characterization, is erroneous as Benin’s economy is based on 
agriculture (cotton being the only export product) and entrepôt-trade. 
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can easily be bypassed in the legislative and budgetary process; and parliament anyhow 
lacks the technical capacity to seriously challenge the administration.  
Furthermore, Benin's particular mode of governing through clientelist networks 
leads to the prevalence of informal politics and a high degree of politicisation of the ad-
ministration. Combined with a low level of material resources, inflexible bureaucratic 
norms, the sub-optimal distribution of personnel (across regions and sectors) and weak 
intra-administrative control and sanctioning mechanisms, this politicisation has largely 
contributed to the administration’s low level of efficacy when it comes to the implementa-
tion of government decisions. Large sections of the administration elude central control – 
at least in part – and the state’s capacity for arbitration and regulation is low. As a result, 
Benin’s political system suffers from a high degree of political immobility. Since the suc-
cessful completion of the “democratic renewal” process, all major reform projects have 
only advanced very slowly or stalled completely. Decentralization, which has been high 
on the donors’ list of priorities, but which took over ten years to implement (it was an-
nounced in the 1991 constitution), is a case in point. The necessary laws were not passed 
until March 2001, following considerable pressure from some of the major bilateral do-
nors, and the municipal elections were only held in December 2002/January 2003.  
These features of the formal political system are inscribed in the nature of the Be-
ninese rent-based political economy which is highly dependent on external aid. In this 
respect, the democratic renewal of 1989/90 has not meant any fundamental change. In the 
1992-1997 period, aid financed 30% of total public expenditure and over 80% of public 
investment (Joekes & Houedete: 17). Thus, Benin’s political economy before and after 
1990 can be considered as that of a “rentier state“ (Bierschenk 1993b). In fact, the coun-
try’s good track record in terms of democracy and human rights since the 1990s have un-
doubtedly impacted positively on development aid levels. This phenomenon is referred to 
in Benin as the “democracy bonus” (prime de la démocratie).  
Thus, political parties, civil society associations and the media8 operate in a diffi-
cult environment which makes it difficult for them to play their role as “bellwethers of 
democracy” (Sandbrook 1996: 70). Since 1991, the number of political parties in Benin 
has increased from 38 to over 122 (PNUD 2000: 44). This seemingly high fragmentation 
of the party system, which observers often cite as its main weakness, is however mislead-
ing.9 There are in fact two types of political party in Benin (Hounkpe & Lalaye 2000/01): 
only a handful dominate national political life and, over the last 12 years, they have ac-
counted for around 80 % of the seats in parliament. These parties each have a regional 
monopoly and are based on alliances of political leaders in a given region.10 (However, 
they are not ethnic parties, as it is often falsely claimed – all regions in Benin are multi-
ethnic.) Through participation in national elections they try to get into a position to form a 
                                                 
8 For a critical study of Benin's media, see Adjovi 2003. 
9 In an extraordinary show of Anglo-Saxon bias, Sandbrook (1996: 76) considers that “most propitious for 
durable and effective democratic governance is a two-party system of stable coalition of parties organised 
on a left-right basis” and concludes that the prospects of democracies in the Anglophone countries of 
Ghana, Tanzania and Zambi are more favourable than those in the francophone countries of Mali, Niger and 
Madagascar. 
10 On the regional level, we thus find the same kind of one-party dominance (a term which is preferable to 
partis uniques régionaux as used by  PNUD 2000: 67) which characterises many African neo-democracies, 
cf. Bogaards 2000 and Randall & Svasand 2000. Because of Benin’s particular political geography, it has, 
however, not led to a dominant (non-authoritarian) party system on the national level. 
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government and to advance the interests of their regional electorate (Bako-Arifari 1995, 
Gbessemehlan & Rijnierse 1995).11 
The other 100 or so parties do not aspire to win elections and do not even seriously 
aim at being represented in parliament. In the majority of cases, the creation of a party 
and the participation in an election are merely a means for individual local political lead-
ers and their followers to measure their political weight in the hope of being granted posi-
tions in government after the elections. (The same strategy also explains the high number 
of candidates in presidential elections – 17 in 2001 – most of whom have no serious 
chance of winning.) This strategy is fostered by the electoral system which guarantees 
representation for a maximum of diverse local interests once they are able to muster a 
minimum of votes in at least one given electoral district, thus creating a “parliament of 
minorities” (Hounkpe & Lalaye 2001).12 And while new parties are being created every 
year, no party ever dissolves so that many of Benin’s over 100 parties could at best be 
considered dormant structures. 
Thus, Beninese political parties are very light organizations built around the per-
sonal ambition of individual politicians (or coalitions of “big men” in the case of the lar-
ger parties), who are also their main sponsors as a rule. Reliable figures on party member-
ship do not exist, and it can be safely assumed that there is a very large grey zone between 
a limited number of party activists (financed by the big men of the party) and the party’s 
electorate, where membership is simply claimed or assumed and in any case shifting and 
potentially multiple. Internal conflicts are typically resolved by splitting up: in case of 
political defeat, the losing faction leaves the party and either creates a new party or joins 
an existing one. These pronounced segmentary tendencies are a fundamental trait of many 
African institutions, from lineages and villages to businesses and religious associations 
and for the political anthropologist they are reminiscent of the shifting coalitions and alli-
ances of Benin’s precolonial chiefdoms.13 
As MPs and parties are not elected on the basis of a programme, but act as a link 
between the electorate of a given area and the national centres of power, this “political 
transhumance”, as it is called in Benin and often deplored, would appear to be not incon-
sistent with the interests of the electorate: politicians are not elected to defend policy is-
sues but to ensure that government resources are channelled to their region of origin.14 
The party context within which the local MP fulfils this function is seen as being of sec-
ondary importance.15 In fact, like in many other “neo-democracies” (Schmitter 1999) in 
                                                 
11 Twelve parties or party alliances are represented in the parliament elected on 30 March 2003, but only 
five of them account for 71 (e.g. 86 %) of the 83 seats. 
12  As the recent (2002) French presidential elections show, the mechanism described here is not limited to 
Africa. The proliferation of parties cannot, however, be explained by proportional representation per se, as 
suggested by Sandbrook (1996: 81). 
13 For an excellent regional case study of these segmentary tendencies in Benin’s party system, cf. Badou 
2003. 
14 See Wantchékon 2003 empirical study which finds that in Benin, in particular men prefer a clientelist 
election platform (providing jobs and resources to a given region) over a programmatic one. That women 
prefer programmatic platforms is plausibly explained by the fact that, compared to men, they have relatively 
little to gain from a clientelist approach to politics. However, the reference to the influence of the ONG 
Vidole in this context shows that things need to be treated with caution, as Wantchékon fails to explain that 
Vidole is the NGO of former president Soglo’s wife, herself leader of the RB party, and as such clearly part 
of the clientelist outfit of the RB party. 
15 To lose an MP to another party is not, however, in the interest of party leaders who are also expected to 
be the main providers for their party. A law passed by parliament in July 2001 stipulates that an MP who 
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the world, personalities are prior over parties, and the usual case is for prominent people 
trying to hedge their status by joining a political party or, more frequently, creating one, 
than for politicians gaining national prominence through a party career. Thus, it is not 
surprising that most parties have no political programme and no technical capacities in 
terms of policy analysis. In addition, parties and individual MPs that find themselves in 
opposition after an election tend to gravitate towards the government. As one notorious 
party-hopping MP recently declared, “opposition does not feed a man” (Le Cordon, 
19.7.01). As a result, all major parties have been seriously weakened by secession and 
splits since 1996. 
While political parties are main players in Benin’s democracy, they themselves are 
not democratic institutions.16 In particular, the composition of party lists for elections is 
never subjected to a democratic vote by members. Instead, it is decided in complex 
rounds of negotiations by the parties’ big men (and sometimes, as in the case of the Ren-
aissance of Benin/RB, the main national opposition party, big women), which remain 
opaque to outside observers and probably most party “members”.17 Conflict over the or-
der of candidates on a list is the main reason why individuals leave one party and join 
another. Another important characteristic of Benin’s multi-party democracy is the absence 
of the efficient regulation of party finances. The 1999 law on party finances, which puts a 
ceiling on the expenses associated with election campaigns and requires parties to publi-
cize their sources of finance, has been systematically violated by all major parties in re-
cent years. All parties need sponsorship from business people who are, in turn, largely 
dependent on government contracts at national and local level. The feedback mechanism 
created in this way is a major cause of the rising spiral of corruption that has plagued the 
country in recent years (Bako-Arifari 2001). 
3. The local context: Parakou before the recent municipal elections18 
Parakou and the surrounding region of Borgou are located in northern Benin, formerly 
known as the colony of Dahomey. As the capital of a former colonial cercle and present-
day province and thanks to its important location on the end of the south-north railway 
line, Parakou grew from a large village of about 3,000 inhabitants in 1900 to an urban 
centre with over 150,000 inhabitants and, today, it is by far the biggest city in north Benin 
and the third-largest in the country. Over the past century, its administrative and entrepôt 
functions (it is here that goods travelling from the coast to the Sahel states, in particular 
Niger, have to be unloaded from train to lorry) have attracted immigrants from all over 
the country and beyond, transforming Parakou into Benin’s most multi-ethnic city. 
Nowadays, probably over a third of the city’s population has originated from the coun-
try’s south. In fact, the sudistes who came to Parakou in large numbers from the 1930s 
onwards to work in its different administrative services or with the railway, were gener-
                                                                                                                                                  
leaves the party on whose list he was elected loses his mandate (Le Cordon, 26.7.01); however, this law has 
been declared unconstitutional in its current form by the Constitutional Court. 
16 This theme of party organisation, in particular inner-party democracy, is severely under-researched for 
Africa outside the southern African region, as is the question of party finance. 
17 In the weeks before the first round of the municipal elections of December 2002, Rosine Soglo, the wife 
of the former President Soglo and the leader of the “Renaissance du Bénin (RB)” party, turned up several 
times at the headquarters of the National Election Commission in order to change the order on the lists that 
the party presented in Cotonou.  
18 The following section draws heavily on research in Parakou over the last ten years. This research has 
been partially documented in Bierschenk 1993a and Bierschenk 2000. For parallel research on politics in 
Benin’s rural areas, see Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 1998. 
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ally better educated and had more lucrative jobs than people immigrating from the north-
ern regions. Naturally, this generated resentment among their northern countrymen and 
this situation has been skilfully exploited by local politicians since the very beginnings of 
local democracy in the 1950s. In this “frontier town” (Kopytoff 1987) where nobody’s 
local roots go back further than three generation, an ethnicising discourse, drawing a 
sharp line between “southerners” and “northerners”, has been a constant factor of local 
politics since colonial times (no local politician with any ambition could refrain from 
playing on this theme), and has produced occasional violent outbreaks by a supposedly 
“autochthonous” (e.g., “northern”) population against “immigrants from the south”. In 
fact, the southern Beninese often associate Parakou with occasional but recurring massive 
outbursts of violence, usually in association with a political election. Such outbursts often 
resemble pogroms directed against the members of the population originating from the 
south. The riots in 1963 and 1991 are examples of events that made headlines throughout 
the country. 
Prior to the recent municipal elections, the central state was represented in Para-
kou by the circonscription urbaine, the urban district authority, whose chief representa-
tive was the (appointed) urban district head, known locally as the chef cir. The urban dis-
trict authority was, however, by no means the only body incorporating a local state pres-
ence. It constantly had to co-ordinate its activities with the other local instances of the 
central state which included (and still include) the police, the gendarmerie, the courts 
(whose status was significantly increased in 1989 following the “democratic renewal of 
1989) and various technical services (school authorities, health authorities, road construc-
tion authorities, the agricultural administration etc.). The Prefect, or regional governor of 
Borgou province, also plays a special role here, as he is resident in Parakou. Formally 
speaking, he represents a separate hierarchical level between the central state and the dis-
trict authority, although, in reality, he sometimes intervenes directly in the city’s affairs. 
For example, until recently, he was responsible for the regulation of the inner city prop-
erty market. 
However, the city was managed not only by these various local state instances, but 
also by a series of intermediate institutions. In 2002, these included the elected mayors of 
five municipalities (communes) into which the city was divided and heads of the twenty-
one city neighbourhoods wards (quartiers) (elected in 1991 and ever since then waiting to 
be re-elected, until the recent municipal elections), the so-called traditional chiefs who 
include, in particular, the “King” of Parakou and a few other less important chiefs from 
the outlying districts, various organizations representing economic actors, in particular the 
trucking companies, the people who run the cross-country taxi service, the cotton manu-
facturers, the Parakou Citizen’s Association (association de ressortissants) TEMBI, the 
“Council of Sages”, which consists almost exclusively of pensioned civil servants, and the 
Islamic association. All of these organizations were either represented to varying degrees 
on the consultative council, which was established in 1990, or they are invited to partici-
pate in its consultations on specific occasions.  
Many of these intermediate organizations were (and continue to be) founded on 
diffuse membership criteria, and, indeed, in many cases mandatory membership which is 
associated with certain territorial or professional criteria, which are not necessarily ob-
served in reality. Their internal modes of functioning are very opaque and, despite the 
existence of a formal election procedure, they are usually controlled by a few individuals. 
They function in accordance with a co-optation logic primarily based on candidates’ repu-
tation and socio-political status and – to a limited extent – financial resources. In many 
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cases, their members do not join voluntarily and they are not always aware of their mem-
bership. For example, the way its leaders see it, every inhabitant of Parakou is a member 
of the citizens’ association TEMBI – provided that he/she originates from the north and 
not the south of the country. These organizations act, together with, independently of and 
sometimes against the different instances of the state, as instances for the regulation of 
social relations and political conflicts. They tax their members in different ways, and may 
even use physical violence to this end. For example, the chairman of the Association of 
Motorcycle Taxis at one point had road blocks erected to force payment of membership 
fees. In other words, these authorities, which appear to the untrained eye as civil state 
organizations, compete directly with the state in three core areas: they contest its constitu-
tive monopolies in the exercise of power, regulation and taxation. 
The type of political system in place at local level in Parakou before 2002 could 
thus be described as a “negotiated political order” that was neither democratic nor des-
potic.  Instead, it was based on the principle of participation via clientelist networks domi-
nated by local elites. One of the major features of this system is its high degree of institu-
tional and legal pluralism. Local political arenas are multi-centred and central state repre-
sentatives are unable to impose decisions on powerful local players. Decisions are based 
on complicated negotiations between the local representatives of the state, different seg-
ments of the local political elites and a multitude of local institutional actors (traditional 
chiefs, development associations, NGOs, religious groups, local sections of political par-
ties, peasants' organizations, the security forces etc.). In the absence of a clear system of 
rules, regulations and sanctions, and given the number of local vetoing powers, these de-
cisions are notoriously difficult to implement. In other words, the local administration has 
very weak arbitration and regulatory powers and this contributes to the semi-autonomy 
enjoyed by local political groups.  
The described systematic mediation of state rule at local level corresponds to a 
characteristic system of public finance. This is based only partly on the logic of taxation 
and, to a significant extent, on a logic of sponsorship. Special appeals (appells à contribu-
tion) are launched to acquire resources for public projects such as road construction or the 
renovation of the city high school. Intermediary organisations mentioned above can par-
ticipate in these projects as, so to speak, privileged tax payers. This system of financing 
local community tasks through donations can be seamlessly extended to a system of fi-
nancing by decentralised development-aid donors. In fact, Parakou profits from a host of 
development projects, and a myriad of NGOs are active in the city. The combined amount 
of money that flows into the city in this way surpasses many times the resources based on 
local taxes and transfers from the Benin government.19 At the same time, this system rein-
forces the need for constant negotiations between the participating actors. 
Local civil societies are not very developed and barely differentiated from political 
elite networks. So-called civil society leaders often double as civil servants or politicians. 
In addition, the formal local economy is highly embedded in the political context: the 
larger private sector operators all depend to an enormous extent on contracts with the ad-
ministration. Indeed, main local actors typically “straddle” the sectors of polity, economy 
and civil society and, as a rule, have multiple identities and functions. 
                                                 
19 For an assessment of local finances, see Braun 2003. An analysis of the comparative weight of local fi-
nancial sources and donor based financial inflows does not yet exist. 
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4. Local elections in Benin and Parakou, December 2002/January 2003 
The national and local political contexts described in the preceding sections raises inter-
esting considerations with respect to the probable destiny of the local democratic institu-
tions which have recently been introduced in Benin as part of decentralization policy. 
Two alternative scenarios would appear to be possible in the long term. In one of these, 
the political authorities to be created, in particular the elected municipal council and the 
mayoralty, will succeed in forcing the other actors, bodies and authorities to observe its 
regulative competencies and register of legitimacy and thus become the main focus of 
local politics in the long term. Such a situation whereby “democracy becomes the only 
game in town” is what the donor countries hope for. In a less optimistic scenario, the pre-
existing local logic involving negotiation among a limited number of players as the main 
mode of local politics will remain intact, and the new authorities will have to negotiate 
their place and role in the existing configuration of the myriad local political instances 
and bodies.  
The story and its main actors 
The institutionalisation of democracy in Benin was finally completed in December 2002 
and January 2003 when local elections were held in two rounds following a very turbulent 
election campaign which, although not entirely peaceful, passed without any major out-
breaks of violence. As already mentioned, the institutionalisation of local democracy had 
been on the political agenda since the “democratic renewal” of 1989/90 and had, indeed, 
been prescribed by the 1991 constitution. Despite the considerable interest shown in the 
process by France and Germany, Benin’s two major bilateral donors, it had taken over ten 
years for all of the necessary laws to be put in place. From the late 1990s, repeated an-
nouncements were made about the holding of local elections in the near future, however 
the elections were always deferred. After the presidential election of spring 2001, in 
which President Kérékou was re-elected for a second – and constitutionally last – term, it 
was widely expected that he would cash in on the momentum of the successful presiden-
tial campaign and finally give the go-ahead for local elections. Also, the holding of local 
elections within six months of the presidential election would have made it possible to use 
the existing electoral register and thus make considerable savings. However, the opportu-
nity passed again until, finally, in early 2003, new electoral lists were drawn up and a date 
was set for the first round of local elections. The major parties set up their electoral com-
mittees to prepare the campaign by early autumn 2003.20 
In September 2002, the political parties which supported president Kérékou (the 
“presidential movement”) which at the time was a minority group in parliament, decided 
to present a unified list at the local elections as the Union du Bénin du Future (UBF). 
Bruno Amoussou, the main figure in the presidential movement after President Kérékou 
hinself, Minister of Planning, leader of Benin’s Social Democratic Party (PSD) – as such 
the main representative of the south-western region (the Mono) in Benin’s political geog-
raphy – and a man widely tipped by all political observers as one of the most likely suc-
cessors of Kérékou after 2006, emerged as the national coordinator of the UBF. Under 
Bruno Amoussou, there was a group of departmental (provincial) coordinators who or-
ganized the compilation of the election lists in Benin’s 77 new communes or municipali-
ties (former sous-prefectures and districts urbains). Kérékou had proposed that the UBF’s 
                                                 
20 For an analysis of political parties and their strategies in Parakou in the course of the various national 
elections of the 1990s, cf. Badou 2003. 
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lists should be created on the basis of a bottom-up process, a kind of “primaries” process 
whereby the “local population” would decide on the composition of the lists in each elec-
toral ward. Thus, the UBF coordinators travelled across the country to organize these 
primaries. 
Among Benin’s 77 communes, the elections in the three largest towns which had a 
special status expressed by the term municipality – Cotonou (the "economic capital"), 
Porto-Novo (the political capital) and Parakou (the “capital” of the North) – were obvi-
ously of particular interest. There was little real doubt that the Renaissance du Benin (RB) 
party, the main opposition party run by former president Soglo and his wife which has its 
strongholds in the centre-south of the country around the old pre-colonial capital 
Abomey, would take Cotonou where southerners largely outnumber the northerners. 
There was never any doubt either that the PRD, the party of Adrien Houngbedji, the sec-
ond major opposition figure at the time and president of the National Assembly, would 
win in its fief of Porto-Novo. In fact, many people believed that the likelihood of the op-
position assuming power in Benin’s two largest cities had been a considerable factor be-
hind the government’s and president’s hesitancy in giving the go-ahead for the local elec-
tions. It should be noted that, like Kérékou, for reasons of age, Soglo is constitutionally 
ineligible to contest the presidency in 2006. Thus, the prospect of becoming mayor of 
Cotonou offered him an opportunity to increase his political influence as well as gaining a 
kind of revenge for having lost the presidency to Kérékou in 1996 as the incumbent. Like 
Bruno Amoussou, Houngbedji, on the other hand, can and most likely will run for presi-
dent in 2006, and for him retaining power over the city of Porto-Novo was an asset in a 
different political strategy. 
There was also never any doubt that the UBF, the alliance behind President 
Kérékou, whose major stronghold is located in the north of the country, would take Para-
kou. The north had been the fief of the FARD-Alafia party during the first two parliamen-
tary elections (1991 and 1996). However, this party’s exclusive regionalist (i.e. northern) 
character, which made it difficult for Kérékou’s southern supporters to vote for it, was 
increasingly perceived as problematic. Its image as a party of the north put a quasi-natural 
ceiling on its potential for growth. Furthermore, the FARD-Alafia’s position in the north 
was weakened in 1997 when a large internal opposition group left the party and founded 
the CAR-Dunyia. One reason for the founding of the UBF – in which Bruno Amoussou, a 
"Southern" politician, was instrumental – was probably to overcome the northern parties’ 
narrow regionalist bias and, in anticipation of the parliamentary elections of March 2003, 
to create a wide political alliance around President Kérékou with a country-wide base.  
The municipal elections were seen as a test of this strategy.21 Ousmane Batoko, at 
the time Civil Service Minister – one of the very few major political advisors who had 
been consistently close to President Kérékou from at least the 1980s, and who was also 
credited with the aspiration of contesting the forthcoming presidential election of 2006 – 
was the candidate most likely to win in Parakou. He had been referring to himself pub-
licly as the “natural mayor” of Parakou for years. In 1999, he was elected from the 
FARD-Alafia list as the first of four members of parliament for the Parakou electoral dis-
trict (which extends beyond the municipality of Parakou). In December 2002, he even 
                                                 
21 This strategy was vindicated by the results of the March 2003 parliamentary election, in which the UBF 
won by far the largest number of seats (31out of 83), and boosted both the standing of the UBF’s national 
coordinator, Bruno Amoussa, and his chances in the competition to succeed Kérékou. 
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published a kind of local development programme, the only major Parakou politician to 
do so.22  
However, a rift occurred in October 2003; Batoko withdrew from the UBF and 
presented independent FARD-Alafia lists in Parakou’s three electoral wards (arrondisse-
ments), while in the rest of the country FARD candidates sailed under the UBF flag. At 
the same time, a new name emerged on the local political scene, Rachidi Gbadamassi who 
was hitherto largely unknown as a politician. In other words, there was a split in the 
presidential movement in its northern fief of Parakou and the local campaign was increas-
ingly perceived by the national media as a personal contest between the two opposing 
figures who represented two very different types of political actor (even though 
Gbadamassi was only based in second position on one of the UBF lists and claimed, until 
well after the elections, not to be interested in the mayor's seat). Based on his age (around 
60) and profession (civil servant and professional politician), in a sense Batoko, the son of 
a former mayor of Parakou (in the late 1950s), represented the older traditional type of 
politician who had been running the country since, and even before, independence, while 
Gbadamassi, a rich local Yoruba businessman of around 35 years of age and president of 
the local football club (the Parakou Buffalos) liked to present himself as representative of 
the younger generation. Gbadamassi was a member of an intra-UBF tendency which had 
been active under the title of comité des jeunes pour une relève de qualité for some time. 
During the campaign, both men claimed to have the support of President Kérékou (and 
both systematically dismissed the other’s claim in this regard), however Kérékou himself 
remained silent on this issue – in public at least – until the end.23  
In fact, local observers considered the contest to be a three-horse race between Ba-
toko,  Gbadamassi and Amadou Moutari who was also seen (realistically, as it emerged) 
as having a good chance of making an impact. Around 50 years of age, which in Beninese 
perception still classifies him as a member of the “younger generation”, Moutari was, 
even more than Gbadamassi, a newcomer to politics. He was a former Air Afrique pilot 
who ran a successful travel agency in Cotonou and was president of the company which 
managed the local market hall Arzeke. When he decided to run for the municipal council, 
instead of joining either the UBF or the FARD-Alafia, he preferred to create his own elec-
toral alliance named ASSIRI (lit. in Dendi: the confided secret, in the sense of pact, 
agreement), and persuaded Lolo Chidiac, a Lebanese-Beninese of around 70 years of age, 
who had been one of the most notorious trouble-makers in local and national politics 
since independence, to join him. Despite the fact that Moutari, like the UBF and the 
FARD-Alafia, vaguely considered himself as close to the presidential movement, he pre-
ferred to be seen as officially independent of any particular national political affiliation.  
Of course, the RB party, the party of ex-president Soglo – which is viewed in 
Parakou as very much the party of the “southerners” and which had, to everybody’s sur-
prise, won one of the four parliamentary seats for Parakou in the 1999 parliamentary elec-
tions – presented lists in all three electoral wards, hoping to win most of the votes of the 
                                                 
22 FARD-Alafia, Sous-section de Parakou, Nos priorités pour Parakou (2003 – 2007), s.l. décembre 2002. 
In fact, this programme contained the conclusions of a seminar conducted in 1997 under the auspices of two 
local NGOs, one of them run by Batoko and financed by French technical cooperation; in the run up to the 
municipal elections in 2002, the local section of FARD-Alafia simply re-issued the seminar conclusions 
under the party name. 
23 Gbadamassi had a poster printed which showed him standing next to Kérékou who was seated at his desk. 
FARD-Alafia threatened to take the UBF to court, claiming that it was illegal for local candidates to use the 
image of the president for their publicity, however the threat came to nothing. 
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40% of the city’s population originating from the south. Apart from these four major par-
ties or lists, another 18 parties or lists, many of them created on an ad hoc basis for these 
elections, contested the election, some of them only in one or two electoral wards, and 
most of them with obviously no real chance of winning any seats.24  
The campaign was very animated but, surprisingly in view of Parakou’s notoriety 
for ethnic troubles, completely free of violence, and very few ethnic or regionalist refer-
ences were made by the candidates.25 The major exception here was Batoko, who, when 
he began to get a sense that victory would not come easy, increasingly referred in his pub-
lic speeches to a putative “plot against the north”. Some anonymous tracts denigrating the 
personal character of candidates were circulated, however this appears to have been lim-
ited to the parties fighting for the support of the RB electorate. Also, there were hardly 
any attempts at electoral fraud, and the few that did occur, were not politically organized. 
Thus, by all accounts, the elections were “free and fair”, and the turnout, in the first round 
at least, was very high (over 75%), as it had been in all elections in Parakou since 1991. 
In the first round of the elections in December 2003, the UBF won six out of the 
eight seats in Parakou’s second electoral ward, while the FARD-Alafia won the remaining 
two. Both Batoko and Gbadamassi were elected to the municipal council, Batoko as head 
of his list and Gbadamassi as number three on the UBF list. As required under the elec-
toral law, a second round of elections was held in the two other electoral wards in which 
no party had gained a 40% majority (the constitutional court took an unexpectedly pro-
tracted period to confirm the first-round results). The final result was that out of 25 coun-
cil seats, the UBF took 16, the FARD-Alafia five, the ASSIRI three and the RB two (cf. 
table on p. 22). In other words, the results mirrored those in the southern cities where the 
parliamentary opposition won overwhelming majorities, the difference being that in Para-
kou, the dominating tendency (presidential movement) was split into three parties repre-
sented in the municipal council, while in the southern cities the hegemonic tendencies (the 
parliamentary opposition) expressed themselves in a single party.26 
Previously, Gbadamassi had declared several times in public that, despite being 
the most visible and outspoken politician on the UBF list, he had no intention of becom-
ing mayor. In fact, he was only positioned in second place, and there was one person 
ahead of him and one behind who looked like far more likely candidates: Yacoubou As-
souma, a former minister and now General Secretary of the Ministry of Finance who is 
known locally as “de Gaulle” on account of his physical height, and Baba Moussa Allas-
sane who, like Batoko, is the son of one of the first generation of politicians in Parakou 
(his father was member of the territorial assembly in the 1950s), technical director for 
water in the National Society for Electricity and Water and president of Parakou’s devel-
                                                 
24 Thus, around 350 candidates on 20 lists contested the 25 council seats. The largest of the smaller lists 
were the IRETI (which presented itself as the political voice of the Yoruba/Nagot population) with 5,0 % of 
the vote (weighted average in the first round in all of Parakou), the UCB-Faaba (3,2 %) of Nazaire Dossa, 
RUND (3,1 %) and BARKA (3,0 %) of Aboudou Saidi, a former chef de district who claimed that most of 
Parakou’s current major infrastructure had been created when he was running the town hall. 
25 While in other regions of Benin, small outburst of pre-electoral and post-electoral acts of violence were 
reported, for example in Cotonou and Ouessé (Le Progres, 17.2.2003). In Malanville, one person died in 
post-electoral violence. 
26 In Cotonou, the RB won 32 of 51 seats and Soglo was elected mayor; in Porto-Novo, the PRD gained 24 
out of 25 seats and Houngbedji was elected mayor. However, he later resigned from this post and took up 
his seat in the National Assembly, which he won in March 2003, and afterwards, to everybody’s great sur-
prise, – he had formed an alliance with Soglo in the previous parliament -- he joined the presidential move-
ment, no doubt in anticipation of the presidential elections of 2006.  
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opment association since early 2003. My personal bet at the time was that “de Gaulle” 
would succeed in becoming mayor (see the annex in Bierschenk 2004 for a sociological 
profile of Parakou's municipal councillors). 
After the two rounds of elections, for several weeks the city resounded with all 
sorts of speculation about all kinds of alleged political manoeuvres as part of the major 
candidates’ efforts to ensure that they would gain sufficient votes to secure the mayoralty. 
It should be noted that Benin’s notoriety for the pervasiveness of its corruption is matched 
by its reputation as the home of vodun and all kinds of other occult practices. There is no 
doubt that political manoeuvring was going on an intense scale: more than once, our in-
terviews with local politicians were interrupted by phone calls from other politicians, 
more often than not from a different party. A key issue was the transfer of votes from 
those parties which had failed to attain the minimum of 10% of the vote necessary to be 
allowed to contest the second round of elections. The most important of these were the 
IRETI, the UCP-FAABA, the RUND and the BARKA (cf. note 24), and it later emerged 
that the leader of the second was offered, and accepted, the post of general secretary of 
the regional Chamber of Industry and Commerce, while the leader of the fourth was 
awarded the post of special advisor to the mayor.27   
However, the negotiations were by no means limited to local politicians (this, at 
least, was the firm conviction of everybody we spoke to in Parakou) and also involved 
numerous interventions on the part of national politicians. Many people, including, it 
would appear, Batoko himself, expected that he would ultimately manage to rally the 
UBF councillors with help in the wings from Kérékou.28 One rumour was that “de 
Gaulle” was being offered the post of ambassador to Morocco, Lebanon or Saudi Arabia 
– the country varied according to the different accounts in circulation – and Baba Moussa 
the directorship of the West African interstate school of engineering in Burkina Faso so as 
to eliminate them from the race. The weak performance of the FARD-Alafia and Batoko 
clearly validated the UBF’s strategy and thus strengthened the chances of the UBF’s na-
tional coordinator, Bruno Amoussou, against Batoko in the struggle to succeed Kérékou. 
From this obvious observation, it was only a small step to the conclusion that Batoko fell 
victim to a Machiavellian coup actively orchestrated by Amoussou with the help of 
Gbadamassi. Another name which cropped up as somebody active behind the scenes was 
that of Yaya Boni, a native of Parakou and current president of the West African Devel-
opment Bank (WADB/BOAD) which was in the final stage of negotiations for two loans 
to the city of Parakou in the road construction and electric energy sectors. 
This was when Gbadamassi demonstrated once again – to anyone who may still 
have doubted him – what an adept politician he is. It appears that he first took the UBF 
councillors to the traditional king of Parakou where he made everybody swear on the 
Qur’an that, whatever might happen, they would all vote for the candidate they had cho-
sen among themselves. To make doubly sure, he also made them drink a potion, prepared 
                                                 
27 It appears that the local leader of the RUND (Idrissou Ibrahim), who was MP for Parakou at the time of 
the local elections, saw his participation in the municipal elections rather as a test for the up-coming parlia-
mentary elections when, however, he lost his seat. In any case, he seems not to have been included in any 
negotiation for the transfer of votes. Most RUND candidates supported ASSIRI in the second round. IRETI 
candidates supported UBF in the second round. There was no apparent compensation in terms of posts, but 
many people in Parakou are convinced that IRETI leaders had received financial gratifications for their 
UBF support. 
28 Arouna Boubakar, the second most prominent among FARD-Alafia’s elected municipal councillors, 
publicly predicted that the issue of the mayoralty of Parakou would be decided by Kérékou himself. Cf. Le 
Nouvel Essor (Parakou), 28.1.2003 
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at the court of the king, which, it was said, would cause the death of anyone who would 
try to betray his fellow councillors. Some reports say that Yacoubou Assouma and Baba 
Moussa did not participate in this ritual but that all the others did. Gbadamassi then took 
the whole group (again with the exception of Yacoubou Assouma, Baba Moussa and also 
without Alima Abdoulaye and Al-Hadj Vita) to an unknown location – to Germany, it 
was said in town --, from which they did not return until the evening of the election of the 
mayor by the city council. Later, it became known that they had gone to stay in a hotel in 
Lomé in Togo, all expenses paid by Gbadamassi. (It was in this hotel that Yaya Boni was 
said to have met Gbadamassi.) It further appears that on the eve of the meeting of the mu-
nicipal council for the election of the mayor, Gbadamassi called a meeting of the UBF 
councillors and asked who was going to go forward as a candidate for the mayoralty. Both 
Yacoubou Assouma and Baba Moussa declared their intention to contest the mayoralty, 
whereupon Gbadamassi proposed that the two go to another room so as to decide among 
themselves who would be the candidate. When the two returned after an hour and con-
fessed that they had not been able to settle the issue, Gbadamassi declared that in that case 
he himself would go forward and nobody objected. 
The following day Gbadamassi turned up at the inaugural session of the new city 
council with  twelve other UBF councillors all dressed in clothing made of the same fab-
ric, as is the Beninese custom for close friends, a husband and wife, a man and his mis-
tress or the members of a local association when attending social occasions like wed-
dings.29 When the prefect asked for the candidates for the mayoralty to declare them-
selves, three men put themselves forward: Gbadamassi for the UBF, Batoko for the 
FARD-Alafia and Moutari for the ASSIRI. In the secret ballot, Gbadamassi obtained 18 
votes (thus two more than the number of UBF councillors), Batoko obtained five (one 
more than his party’s number of seats) and Moutari only got one (ASSIRI had three coun-
cillors). One ballot was spoiled. It is widely speculated that the two RB councillors voted 
for Gbadamassi, as did Moutari’s two fellow ASSIRI councillors, while from the UBF 
group, either Yacoubou Assouma or Baba Moussa voted for Batoko and the other spoiled 
his vote. We cannot know for sure, but examination of the list of functions in the new 
council reveals strikingly that most councillors were allocated assignments (which entail 
more or less significant expense allowances) with the exception of the FARD-Alafia 
group, Moutari of ASSIRI (although his fellow ASSIRI councillors have assignments) 
and, within UBF, Alimatou Abdoulaye, Baba Moussa Allassane and Assouma Yacoubou 
(see annex in Bierschenk 2004).30 
A few weeks later, Gbadamassi also headed the UBF list at the parliamentary elec-
tions which were held on 30 March 2003. The UBF won three out of the four seats in 
Parakou’s electoral district. For a time, some people thought that Gbadamassi would opt 
for the parliamentary seat, as did his party colleague, Issa Salifou, in Malanville and 
                                                 
29 Allassane Baba Moussa, Yacoubou Assouma, Alimatou Abdoulaye and Al Hadj Vita were not dressed in 
the same “uniform” however. The first three (who had not been in Lome either) obviously wanted to mark 
their distance from Gbadamassi. Later events – in particular the distribution of posts in the municipal coun-
cil – indicate that these three individuals, all of whom were elected on UBF lists, considered themselves, 
and were considered, as being in opposition to Gbadamassi. It is not clear why Al Hadj Vita did not dress 
like Gbadamassi’s group as he was clearly not in opposition to him; he was later elected chef of the 2nd 
arrondissement having been proposed by Gbadamassi. 
30 UBF councillor Mohammed Hadi Sidi is a simple member of the "lucrative" public contracts and procur-
ment. The reason that he has no more prominent function is explained by some by the fact that his commer-
cial activities in the port of Cotonou simply do not leave him enough time to be present in Parakou, by oth-
ers that he has fallen out with Gbadamassi. 
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Adrien Houngbedji in Porto-Novo, as this would give him more scope and time for his 
business in addition to parliamentary immunity. However, he did just the opposite, and 
gave his parliamentary seat to his replacement, (Karimou Saliou Youassou) the president 
of ALKAWALI (see below p.ALKAWALI 19) 
Businessmen entering the political arena 
Gbadamassi’s success indicates a major shift in the sociological composition of Benin’s 
overaged political class. It should be remembered that the country’s political life has been 
dominated by people who have been in politics since the 1980s, if not the 1970s. This is 
not only true of President Kérékou himself, but also of his main opponent, Soglo, who 
was hailed as a new man at the time of the democratic renewal in 1990, but had actually 
already held ministerial office in the late 1960s. “Benin’s political arena”, writes Tessy 
Bakary in Jeune Afrique (April 1996, quoted in Monga 1997: 161), “appears as a sort of 
Jurassic Park, peopled with three species of ‘professional’ politicians: the dinosaurs, or 
has-beens, who dream of once again becoming what they were or what they could not be; 
the wannabes and the others, in between, who dream of becoming something; and the 
born-agains of democracy who appeared after the National Conference.” 
Democratic decentralization has meant that there are around 1000 new political 
posts – council seats – to be filled in the country, and many of them have gone to young 
people. The annexe gives an indication of the rejuvenation of the political class brought 
about by decentralization. Decentralization has not only opened up political arenas in the 
sense that many of the new actors are younger than the established politicians, around 
three quarters of Parakou’s municipal councillors are also new to formal politics. What is 
also striking is the fact that many of those who entered (local) politics with the advent of 
decentralization are businessmen, tradesmen or hold middle-level salaried jobs.31 Out of 
25 municipal councillors, only six (24%) belong to the category of high-ranking civil ser-
vants (often referred to as “intellectuals” in local parlance) which typically constituted 
Benin’s political class in the past. The remaining three quarters belong to sociological 
categories which had not previously been very prominent in politics, under either the 
Marxist-Leninist or democratic renewal regimes: ten (40%) hold middle-level salaried 
jobs (including drivers) or are tradesmen and nine (36%) are businessmen (in fact, seven 
businessmen and two business women) who are involved in trade and transport and would 
appear, for the most part, to be rather wealthy. Of course, Parakou has been renowned 
since the late 1950s for the high social standing and considerable political influence en-
joyed by its commercial class. However, the typical division of labour had been that busi-
nessmen who, in the 1960s and 1970s, were mostly people with very limited schooling, 
financed the politicians who were civil servants and, in exchange, profited from their po-
litical connections. Baba Moussa’s and Batoko’s fathers, who were top actors in Para-
kou’s city politics during the first short wave of democratisation in the 1950s, were, in 
fact, typical examples of this kind of arrangement. One generation later, young business-
men with a higher level of education than their processors32 have decided to enter the po-
litical arena themselves.  
                                                 
31 In this respect, Benin seems to be simply catching up with other African countries where for some time 
businessmen have played an important role in formal politics. For Ghana, see Nugent 2003, for the heavy 
share of businessmen in the Kenyan parliament, see Hornsby 1989. 
32 Gbadamassi is said to have left school during the 8th grade (classe de quatrième). 
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While this phenomenon is most striking at local level, the underlying trend was 
also confirmed in the recent parliamentary elections. In fact, in the sitting parliament (83 
members), high-ranking civil servants hold 38 seats (45%) while 20 (24%) are held by 
members of the liberal professions. (This latter category is completely absent from Para-
kou’s municipal council.) This means that around 70% of the seats are still held by “intel-
lectuals,” however, this is a marked decline from the near 100% they controlled in the 
first parliament of the “democratic renewal” era. Ten MPs (13%) in the current parliament 
are businessmen and a further eight (10%) hold highly-paid salaried positions in the pri-
vate sector. On the other hand, salaried employees and tradesmen, who make up the larg-
est group in Parakou’s municipal council, are absent from the National Assembly.  
It should be noted that women fared fairly badly in Parakou’s municipal elections 
and hold only three seats (12%).33 Two of them are rich business women. In fact, their 
case demonstrates how difficult it is to establish neat socio-professional categories in the 
context of African political economies which are marked by a high degree of “straddling” 
and resource pooling (concurrently or over the course of a life). It is also not evident that 
individual actors are the only relevant units for the analysis of African politics. For the 
socio-economic position of these two business women is at least, in part, also a reflection 
of their husbands’ positions. The husband of Zihratout Deen is a high-ranking army offi-
cer said to be very close to president Kérékou, and Alimatou Abdoulaye had been married 
to Lolo Chidiac, another councillor and an old hand in Beninese politics since at least 
1960. In addition, the latter also commands other types of social capital, for when people 
proposed her for the UBF list, she clearly benefited from the fact that she belongs to one 
of the large old families of Parakou, established in the very heart of the city since before 
colonization, which has produced several notorious top actors involved in the local and 
national political and economic arenas since the early 20th century. It should also be re-
called that Batoko, Baba Moussa and Arouna are direct descendants of top actors in city 
politics from the 1950s. An actor-based analysis of politics clearly needs to be comple-
mented by one based on families, at least on the local level. 
Party finance is, of course, one of the major factors behind this remarkable rise of 
Beninese businessmen as political entrepreneurs. Elections are costly, and political parties 
rely heavily on sponsors to conduct their election campaigns.34 All observers concur that 
the recent local elections saw the entry of money into the realm of politics on a previously 
unprecedented scale.  
The close connection between politicians and businessmen has always been a 
problem in the context of an economy which is politically closely embedded and in which 
                                                 
33 However, the proportion of women in the municipal council is markedly higher than in the National As-
sembly where only 5 out of 83 MPs (6%) are female. Altogether, women represented only 8,4 % of the total 
of 5700 candidates who presented themselves in the local elections of December 2002/January 2003 even 
though female candidatures were encouraged by a number of national NGOs and their foreign donors (Le 
Cordon no. 91, 21.11.2002). -- Other interesting comparisons can be made between the two instances: while 
the average age of MPs and municipal councillors seems to be roughly the same (slightly above 50 years), 
not unexpectedly there are considerably more newcomers to politics in the municipal council of Parakou 
(72%) than in the National Assembly (14%, down from 45% in the first democratically elected assembly of 
1991). These numbers are calculated on the basis of newspaper reports, most notably Le Telegramme, no. 
283 of 5.4.2003, and need to be treated with caution as they are based on the declarations of MPs them-
selves. Little research has been done on the sociological compositon of African parliaments. For one of the 
few studies existing, see Hornsby 1998. 
34 Even though many authors allude to it in passing, the financing of elections and the topic of party finance 
in Africa lack serious investigation.. A few studies do exist, cf. Scott 1982, Banégas 1997, Nugent 2003. 
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success in business depends largely on obtaining government contracts. This structural 
rent-dependency of businessmen is obviously a major source of corruption, which has 
become systemic in the country since the crisis of the late 1980s. If anything, the direct 
entry of young businessmen like Gbadamassi into politics will heighten this trend. 
Gbadamassi is member of a network of businessmen whose activities are centred around 
the port of Cotonou, the country’s “economic lung” (to use a worn-out metaphor coined 
by Benin’s media). The port is a hotbed of corruption and the unofficial receipts which 
are generated there are essential for the financing of political parties and prominent politi-
cians (Bako-Arifari 2001a). The network comprises other politicians, most of them in 
their 30s and 40s – for example, the recently elected mayor of the northern border town of 
Malanville, Issa Salifou, who later gave up his post to take up a seat in parliament – who 
are heavily involved in import activities, in particular the importation of used cars. Many 
observers would see the Minister of Transport at the time of the municipal elections (late 
2002/early 2003), Joseph Attin, as a member of this network. It appears that he runs one 
of the exceedingly lucrative car parks where imported cars are stationed, through a man of 
straw. Benin imports over 250,000 used cars annually, ostensibly for transit to the Sahel 
countries, however only about 35,000 of them are registered at Malanville, the exit point; 
it is assumed that all of the others find their way unofficially to Nigeria.  
It would appear that Gbadamassi’s particular function in this network is to act as 
the carrier of funds between businessmen and politicians. Before the Minister of Trans-
port, Joseph Attin, joined the UBF, Gbadamassi was vice-president of his party.35 In 
1997, he founded and headed a group who, as self-styled representatives of Benin’s youth 
(mouvement des jeunes pour Kérékou), supported the re-election of Kérékou in 2001. 
Thus, he has enjoyed enormous popularity among young people in Parakou for some time 
– and well before his political ambitions became obvious. A kind of Beninese Bernhard 
Tapie, he is the president and the main financier of Parakou’s football club (the Parakou 
Buffalos), a role which gives him a regular platform in the city stadium – where, signifi-
cantly, the UBF held their main election rally in December 2002. When Baba Moussa, 
Assouma de Gaulle and other UBF notables entered, they were greeted with friendly ap-
plause, but when Gbadamassi arrived, it was confetti and standing ovations. In early 
2003, Gbadamassi also financed a general assembly of TEMBI, the city’s development 
association, at which Baba Moussa, his later rival for the mayoralty, was elected presi-
dent. He also appears to be financing two local youth associations. One comprises young 
people engaged in the informal sector, which dominates Parakou’s overland taxi station, 
while the other, ALKAWALI (in Dendi: alliance of trust), appears to represent young 
people with better formal education but uncertain job prospects (in Benin called jeunes 
diplomés sans emploi) or school and university dropouts.36 In both cases, frustration with 
the domination of local political processes by the older generation and the lack of political 
openings for younger people were at the origin of the foundation of these associations.37 
                                                 
35 This could not be confirmed for certain, however. Other interviewees saw Joseph Attin without any par-
ticular party affiliation, and said that Gbadamassi, before joining the UBF, was a member of the RDL party 
(later renamed MERCI) of Sévérin Adjovi, one of Benin’s richest businessmen and one-time minister of 
Defence. Adjovi is also heavily engaged in the car-import business. 
36 Members of ALKAWALI disclaim being financed by Gbadamassi. He is said to have only paid his mem-
bership dues. Other sources pretend that Gbadammasi financed at least the founding congress of 
ALKAWALI in March 2000. 
37 For example, one of the founders of ALKAWALI claims to have been elected by the local FARD-Alafia 
section to head the list for the 1996 national elections, but was then unseated by the order of a big man of 
the party with more clout in the region. The foundation of ALKAWALI in March 2000 was a reaction to 
 20
In particular ALKAWALI positions itself also as an explicit alternative to Parakou’s old-
est and for a long time only development association, TEMBI, which it criticises for its 
narrow ethnic-regionalist base. By contrast, ALKAWALI -- which has an ambition to 
transform itself one day into a political party -- sees itself as an organisation for all of 
Parakou’s politically-minded youth, independent of linguistic or regionalist criteria.38 
When the UBF directive to hold set up lists in the different electoral wards was is-
sued in September 2003, these groups appeared much better organized than the loose net-
works of neighbourhood sages who habitually arrange these things.39 Before the elders 
could act, the youth associations of the second electoral ward had already proposed a list 
with Allassane Baba Mousa in top position, followed by Gbadamassi and only then Ba-
toko (Yacoubou Assouma was fourth.). Batoko protested, not only about his position but 
also about the fact that the list did not contain certain names of his choice. However, in an 
apparently rather stormy “popular assembly” which the youth associations had called at 
very short notice, and of which Batoko claimed to have not even been informed, the ma-
jority of those present decided simply to ignore him, as it ignored the protest of other 
neighbourhood elders who were even, they claimed, threatened with physical violence.40 
This is when Batoko decided to withdraw and sail under the flags of FARD-Alafia. In 
other words, Gbadamassi used the possibilities that the city’s political economy – with 
large-scale structural underemployment of young males in particular – provided for build-
ing up a clientele. But he did modernize these long-existing clientelist practices by relying 
more heavily than other politicians before him on youth associations which he either 
founded or took over, but financed in any case. Furthermore, while concentrating in par-
ticular on the city’s youth, he did not forget the more traditional peddlers of political in-
fluence, in particular the city’s numerous mosques and their imams who all seem to have 
received more or less significant sums of money from him during the election campaign.41 
Apart from the one big meeting in the city’s stadium, already referred to above, he relied 
more heavily than other candidates on a “campaign of proximity” which involved system-
atically visiting all of the city’s neighbourhoods and the canvassing of individual house-
holds by his supporters. As these practices necessarily entail the distribution of monetary 
gifts, they constitute more costly forms of political campaigning than mass meetings.42 
                                                                                                                                                  
this experience which was common to many young people. Soon after the foundation, ALKAWALI was 
coveted by established politicians. 
38 The stress laid by ALKAWALI on not excluding “Southerners” from membership might indicate the end 
of “old-fashioned” ethnic local politics which had been characteristic for Parakou since the early 1950s. 
While it is too early to confirm this trend, it should be recalled that the recent municipal elections were 
largely free of ethnic references, and completely free of organised (ethnic) violence. – There are other youth 
groups in opposition to Gbadamassi, in particular Al-Heri. 
39 Apparently, Gbadammasi approached ALKAWALI already in early 2002 in the name of his collectif des 
jeunes pour une rélève de qualité and ALKAWALI started from Mai 2002 to discuss the establishement of 
election lists. 
40 According to Batoko (Le Republicain no. 563, 27.3.03) the youth “reminded Ali Yérima (a local MP) that 
he was not yet above the age of the whip”. 
41 In one spectacular instance, which was reported to me by several sources, a large crowd had gathered in a 
mosque to mourn the death of its imam, who was one of the city’s most influential imams. Gbadamassi, 
who was present, like all of Parakou’s elite, apparently stood up at the meeting and promised in front of the 
entire congregation that he would finish the construction of the mosque which the deceased imam had left 
unfinished. That same evening, the first lorry arrived with sand and cement. 
42 In the habitual style of local politics, when visiting Parakou’s neighbourhoods, Gbadamassi would first be 
introduced by one of his local supporters who had called the neighbourhood meeting, than give a short 
speech and then distribute four envelopes with money for the mosque, the elderly, the women and the 
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Thus, Gbadamassi represents a new model of economic and social success which 
has been emerging in Benin in recent years, against the backdrop of the country’s rent-
based and highly informalized economy, the close links between the economic and politi-
cal spheres and an almost permanent crisis in the formal education sector and labour mar-
ket for school leavers. It is estimated that around 40,000 young people, in the main male 
and reasonably well educated, are employed, for the most part temporarily, in the infor-
malized service economy around the port of Cotonou. The entry requirements for this 
activity are the ability to speak French, possession of a mobile telephone, a visiting card 
and a lot of time to spend hanging around the port, however what ultimately decides these 
young mens’ economic fortune is the quality of the network they develop with, for exam-
ple, the customs officers. To be a transitaire is one of these informal activities typical for 
Benin which are exercised by far too many people given the limited opportunities they 
provide, in which consequently most people earn very little money on average, but in 
which, with a little luck, the right kind of networking and sufficient cleverness, individu-
als occasionally manage to land a major coup which, if cleverly exploited, may even be-
come the basis for the establishment of a lucrative career. Gbadamassi, in the eyes of 
many young people, succeeded exceedingly well in this: even though he has limited 
schooling, he knows, in his own words, “how to transform 10 million into 20”.43 In this 
world of treasure hunting, success is measured in money, and the corresponding con-
sumption styles lay great stress on the public exhibition of wealth.44 One popular way of 
doing this is for such individuals to mark their rise in the world by throwing a large public 
party every time their income reaches a new level. In the past, this “level” would have 
been set at the first, second, third, tenth million CFA francs (one million CFA francs be-
ing equivalent to around € 1,500) earned, but today people give a party at the billion 
threshold (1 billion CFA francs is equivalent to 1.5 million €). Gbadamassi threw a big 
public party some time ago when his income reached 13 billion. 
Political representation and the selectivity of the electoral system 
The recently elected municipal council is not only selective in terms of the socio-
professional categories represented. The way the democratic election process functions is 
also highly selective in a different and more strictly political sense. As already mentioned, 
Parakou’s population is made up of something between a 30 and 40 % of people who 
originated from the south and settled in the city, sometimes several generations back. 
Many, if not most of them, continue to maintain their links with the south. Locally, they 
are considered as “southerners” (a term which is sometime simply reduced to the eth-
nonym Fon) and as such, foreigners, while the many people who migrated to Parakou 
from the north consider themselves as “locals”. This divide between the northerners and 
southerners in Parakou has provided the backdrop to the recurrent ethnic clashes in the 
city, and has been constantly exploited and reinforced by local politicians.45 
                                                                                                                                                  
youth. On the one occasion on which I observed this process directly, immediately after his departure, a 
physical fight broke out between those present over the distribution of the contents of these envelopes. 
43 The exact quote from the Le Progres newspaper (no. 1122 of 8.3.03) is: “Un homme d’affaire sait trans-
former 10 millions en 20 millions”. 
44 For comparative purposes, see the articles by Salem (2001) and Malaquais (2001) on similar “figures of 
success” in Mauritania and Cameroon. 
45 Bierschenk (2000). The most serious incidents happened in 1964 and 1991 but many smaller incidents 
were not reported by the press.  
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The southerners were largely underrepresented in – if not completely absent from 
– the diffuse pre-decentralization local political system which involved several overlap-
ping political institutions constructed on the basis of clientelism as described in section 3. 
For example, they were expelled from the local development association TEMBI in the 
early 1990s as they were not considered fils de terroir. On the other hand, however, 
southern candidates did much better in the National Assembly elections, as their commu-
nity has a strong tendency for block voting. In all three National Assembly elections in 
the 1990s, they overwhelmingly voted for ex-president Soglo’s Renaissance du Bénin 
(RB) party. In the 1999 elections, the RB obtained over 25% of the votes in Parakou’s 
electoral ward (which is larger than Parakou city) and gained one of the four seats, mak-
ing Parakou the only city in the north were the RB was represented by a MP. 
Ideally, democracy should lead to a more equal political representation of the dif-
ferent constituencies of which Parakou is composed. It may be safely assumed that this 
was the principle which the donors who pushed for local democracy in Benin had in 
mind. That fact that the reality of Benin’s decentralization process differs from theses 
expectations is demonstrated in the table. The winning coalition (UBF) obtained 16 of the 
25 council seats (i.e. 64%) despite having obtained only around one quarter of the votes. 
In terms of the votes cast, the other three parties represented on the council finished very 
close to each other (i.e. between 11.1% and 14.4%), however, their results translated into 
significantly different numbers of seats (one, three and five). The RB had only 11,4% of 
the votes (down from over 25% in the parliamentary elections of 1999), as the southern 
vote was split over several parties, but managed to obtain two seats. Despite recording a 
worse result at the polls (11.1%), the ASSIRI obtained more, e. g. three, seats. Altogether, 
the city council represents only about 64% of votes cast, 36% of the votes having gone to 
smaller parties and lists (over twenty of them in total) which did not gain any seats.(table 
see annex). 
This particular form of selectivity of political representation is, of course, a result 
of the electoral procedure adopted by Benin’s parliament for the local elections, a proce-
dure which is based on the French model but with an even higher in-built bias towards the 
larger groups. As already stated, and as shown by the table, communes and municipalities 
are generally divided into electoral wards – three in the case of Parakou. Only parties and 
lists46 were allowed to stand, and they had to present as many candidates as there were 
seats to be filled in a given ward. Typically, most of the lists were made up of one or, at 
most, two people with some notoriety in town, the rest being mere ciphers whose princi-
pal function was to fill the list. The elections were held in two rounds. Candidates who 
gained at least 40% of votes in the first round were given more than half the seats in the 
electoral wards and the rest were split according to the règle de la plus forte moyenne 
(which again favours the bigger parties) among the totality of parties and lists present. 
This is why the UBF, which won around 42% of the votes in the second electoral ward in 
the first round, gained six out of eight seats, and the FARD-Alafia, with about 16%, ob-
tained two. The remaining 42% of the voters were not represented. If nobody had gained 
40% of the votes in the first round – as was the case in Parakou’s first and third electoral 
ward –, there would have been a second round of elections to which only those parties 
and lists that had obtained over 10% of the votes in the first round would have been ad-
mitted. Not all voters understood this provision, particularly as the same election bulletins 
were used in the second round as in the first, so a considerable number of people contin-
ued to vote in the second round for lists that were not legally eligible. In fact, as late as 
                                                 
46 In this text, I use the terms party and list interchangeably when discussion the local elections. 
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the week before the first round of elections, there were very few people in Parakou – in-
cluding some candidates – who were able to fully understand the electoral system and 
detect the severe bias towards the larger parties and lists that it incorporated. Furthermore, 
not everybody, including the politicians, knew that there was going to be a second round, 
nor the conditions under which it would be held. In the second round, the distortional ef-
fect of the election mode was even greater than in the first round, with the party which 
came first obtaining the majority of the seats.47 
This winner-takes-all thrust of the electoral system had been carefully engineered 
by Benin’s parliament in which, prior to the election in March 2003, the opposition to 
President Kérékou had a majority. It should be recalled that democratic decentralization 
was a reform project which had been pushed by the donors, but about which Benin’s po-
litical class and, in particular, the government had been more than hesitant. In the end, the 
donors prevailed as far as the implementation of the project as such was concerned, but it 
was Benin’s parliamentarians who decided how to put it into practice. Benin’s opposition 
parties (in the 1996 to 2004 assemblies) had a good chance of winning the twin capitals of 
Cotonou and Porto-Novo, given the demographic weighting of the southern populations 
there. In fact, it was this prospect that was probably behind the government’s long hesita-
tion in implementing the process of decentralization. There are several instances in Be-
nin’s history of governments collapsing on foot of social unrest in the capital, and other 
examples can be found in the international context whereby special provisions are made 
for the capital-area to avoid uneasy co-habitations.48 In any case, once there was no way 
to defer decentralization any further, Benin’s parliamentarians devised an electoral proce-
dure that made the likelihood of the opposition winning the capitals into a certainty. There 
is no indication that the donors were aware of this, and if they were, there was nothing 
they could do about it. 
In this way, the establishment of democratic government at local level has rein-
forced the specific existing electoral and political geography of Benin. Paradoxically, the 
recent wave of democratisation in Africa has created de facto one-party systems (or, to be 
more precise, a single dominant party and a fractured opposition) in the most shining 
models of democracy like Mali. Benin appears to be an exception to this rule of neopatri-
monial democracy, with some six to eight parties being seriously engaged in political 
competition on the national level, and with no party in a dominant position. However, a 
closer look reveals that this apparent competitiveness of the Beninese party system actu-
ally rests on parties that all have a very clear regional base and are often regionally domi-
nant. Politically, Benin is divided into four regions, and each of the major four parties 
dominates one of them: the PSD party in the South West (the Mono region) under the 
leadership of Bruno Amoussou, the PRD party in the South East (the Ouémé north of 
Porto Novo) under the leadership of Adrien Houngbedji, the RB party in the centre region 
around Abomey under the leadership of the Soglo couple, and FARD-Alafia in the North, 
under the leadership of Sacca Kina. This political geography has its roots in the late colo-
nial period (it was three regions then, cf. Decalo 1968 and Staniland 1973), it remerged 
                                                 
47 This is why, in the third electoral ward, UBF, with 32 % of the votes, won four seats out of six, ASSIRI, 
with 27 %, only 1, as did FARD-Alafia with 19 %. 
48 There was not elected mayor in Washington, DC until 1973, in Paris until about the same time, and in 
Mexico City until 1997. 
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after the 1990/91 renouveau démocratique and has now been reinforced by democratic 
decentralization.49 
Selectivity is an inherent element of representational democracy. However, it 
might be argued that too strong a degree of selectivity may conflict with the objective of 
political mobilization, which was one of the driving forces behind Benin’s decentraliza-
tion project. In the first round of elections, Benin’s voters came out in large numbers, as 
expected and as they had done in all presidential and parliamentary elections since the 
early 1990s. The first round of municipal elections merely confirmed this tendency, with 
participation at 75%. However, if we compare participation rates in the two wards where 
two rounds were held, they decreased from 78 % to 60 %, which constitutes an unusually 
low turnout for Benin. Almost a quarter of voters (almost 9,000 of a total of 38,000) sim-
ply stayed at home for the second round. This appears to indicate that the peculiar elec-
toral system which Benin has adopted for its local forms of democracy entails a strong 
and very real risk of voter demobilization. 
Little violence but intensive negotiations: democracy as a new way of playing old games 
As we have seen, complex and recurrent negotiations between elite actors and their clien-
teles and violence or the threat of violence were two main features of local politics in 
Parakou prior to 2002. Decentralization aimed to substitute a new currency, i.e. democ-
ratic voting, for the existing ones, i.e. political trading and violence. However, the elec-
tion campaign and subsequent events would appear to indicate that, so far, this substitu-
tion has only been completed to a limited extent. 
Although it was very lively, the election campaign in Parakou was remarkable for 
the almost complete absence of physical violence – even if the “grassroots” approach to 
the establishment of the UBF lists gave those actors who could muster large numbers of 
people in a given place at a given time a significant advantage. It is obvious that these 
crowds (mostly comprising young men) not only constituted a pool of potential voters, 
but also embodied a veiled threat against political opponents.50 In the national context, 
Parakou emerges as a positive exception in terms of the relatively minor role played by 
                                                 
49 However, a recent tendency is the emergence of regional opposition parties, usually outside the big re-
gional centres, which are encouraged by parties which are themselves dominant in other regions. This ten-
dency started in the mid-1990s in the North, where FARD-Alafia was weakened by the emergence of the 
USD party which was allied with the RB (e.g., the “Soglo camp”). More recently, in particular the March 
2003 parliamentary elections, the “Kérékou camp” in turn very successfully applied the same strategy to the 
southern regions, where the PRD party has been weakened by MADEP in the South-East, and the RB party 
in the Centre by Force Clé. These opposition parties also have a clear regional base, even if their territory is 
smaller. As a result of these interlocking regionalist cleavages, there exist now parties in the “South” which 
are allied to the “Northern camp” (e.g., Kérékou), while likewise parties in the “North” are linked to the 
“Southern camp” (e.g., the Soglos). Thus, while regionalism continues to be the main currency of Beninese 
politics, the tendency is increasingly towards micro-regionalism. It should be noted in passing that the same 
tendency is observable in the proto-political spheres of development associations and students’ organisa-
tions. For example, while in the 1960s the FACEEN (Front d’action commune des étudiants et élèves du 
Nord”) was an important spring-board for future politicians, the early 1990s saw the creation of the AEEP 
(Association des étudiants et élèves de Parakou) with a similar function (and from which a line can be 
drawn to ALKAWALI, see above). 
50 This was most marked in the 2nd electoral ward where Gbadamassi and Batoko were opponents. See 
above. 
 25
physical violence in the course of the campaign as many cases of pre and post-electoral 
violence were reported from other parts of the country.51  
On the other hand, however, the electoral procedure devised by the Beninese par-
liament provided ample opportunity for negotiation and political trafficking, both among 
local actors and between local and national politicians: when the lists were being drawn 
up, between the first and second round of elections when the remaining candidates were 
trying to hold their groups together, buy off the leaders of those lists that had failed to 
obtain 10% of the vote and enlist the support of national big men, and after the second 
round of elections, when – in preparation  for the elections of the mayors and their depu-
ties, the political task of the leaders was, again, to hold their groups together and enter 
into secret alliances with municipal councillors from other groups, for example by prom-
ising them posts as councillors and heads of various municipal committees. During this 
period local politicians made frenzied use of mobile telephones for arranging discreet 
meetings, making offers and proposing counter-offers.52 In fact, while the election of the 
mayor was secret, it was easy to deduce who had voted for him and who had not (in part 
quite independently of party affiliation, see p. 16) on the basis of the distribution of dif-
ferent post in the early weeks after Gbadamassi took office. While most of these negotia-
tions obviously took place behind the scenes, the general public was given a distant im-
pression of them through the tracts denouncing one politician or another which circulated 
around the city.53 
We have seen that while both Gbadamassi and Batoko managed to hold their 
groups together and obtain additional votes from councillors elected on other lists 
(Gbadamassi at least two and Batoko – who had clearly hoped for more – just one), Mou-
tari was clearly the loser in this political game: in the end all he had was his own vote as 
both of his fellow councillors had defected. The significance here lies in the fact that 
among the three candidates for the mayoralty, he was the only one who could genuinely 
be labelled a political novice and truly independent candidate who had no support from 
national politicians. Thus, it would appear that while decentralization opened up new are-
nas for new politicians, success still remained dependent on the candidates’ capacity to 
muster the support of national political networks. 
The election of the mayor did not signal the end of the negotiations and circulation 
of tracts, furthermore it marked the re-emergence of physical violence as an expression of 
political conflict, albeit on a limited scale. A particular, if simmering, conflict which 
erupted occasionally had been part of political life in Parakou for around ten years. In the 
early 1990s, Benin received a grant from the French Development Bank AFD (Agence 
Francaise de Développement) for the reconstruction of Parakou’s Arzeke central market. 
This was interpreted locally as a political ploy on the part of President Soglo to increase 
his popularity in the North, however it did not save him from a narrow defeat in the presi-
dential elections of 1996. Such gifts can arouse passions which take the well-intentioned 
donor by surprise, and this was the case with the AFD and the city of Parakou. The AFD 
                                                 
51 See footnote 25. There was one fatality in Malanville arising from the conflict surrounding the election of 
the mayor.  
52 We happened to be present at some of these negotiations and every now and then our discussions with 
local politicians about the strategies they proposed to adopt for the second round were interrupted by phone 
calls from Cotonou, in some cases from very prominent individuals. 
53 Before the election, anonymous tracts were most frequent in RB party circles; it would appear that vari-
ous factions were embroiled in a conflict which was staged, in part, through the circulation of denunciatory 
tracts. After the elections, the tracts – some of which were followed up by the press – appeared to emanate 
mainly from the anti-Gbadamassi camp. 
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had linked its gift to a condition which was written into a contract with the owner of the 
market, i.e. the city, stipulating that a shareholding company be set up to manage the 
market – one quarter of which was to be owned by the city of Parakou and the other three 
quarters by private shareholders – and that the management of market infrastructures be 
self-financing. In concrete terms, this meant that the management company (Société de 
Gestion du Marché de Parakou/SGMP) had to set rents for the market shops and stalls at 
a level that would ensure that it could at least cover its costs. The AFD made the further 
disbursement of funds, for example for a planned car park, conditional on this require-
ment being met. This led to constant haggling between shop owners and the management 
company over the level of the rents. The shop owners accused the management company 
of exploitative practices, arguing that the exorbitant level of rents made it impossible for 
them to run their businesses profitably while the company referred to the constraints im-
posed on them by the contract and the fact that their shareholders had obviously invested 
in the project for the purpose of making a profit. Stormy demonstrations, which were or-
ganized by the shop-owners using slogans calling for social justice but actually staged out 
by the young men at hand, were one of the ways in which the conflict was conducted. 
However, ethnic arguments (at one point the “Dendi” shop-owners accused the manage-
ment company of being run by “Baribas”) were also involved and the city government 
found itself caught in the middle, torn between its desire for civic peace and tranquillity 
which the demonstrations threatened to disrupt, its dual role as owner of the market and 
co-owner of the management company, which had entered into contractual obligations 
with the city council, and the moral obligation to somehow adhere to the legal require-
ments governing the situation. In reality, the situation was even more complex as some 
shop-owners, including, it would appear, some of the company shareholders, had man-
aged to get hold of leases for several shops (which was a breach of the “one shop per per-
son” rule) and sublet them (which was again strictly against the rules) at a higher price – 
which would indicate that the rents charged by the management company were, if any-
thing, lower than their market value.54 
When the job of running the city was handed over by the government-appointed 
chef de la circonscription urbaine to the newly elected mayor and the municipal council, 
the conflict developed a new dimension. As we know, Moutari, who had been defeated in 
the competition for the post of mayor, was the president of the board of the Arzeke mar-
ket management company. During the campaign, Gbadamassi had accused him several 
times of using company resources (in particular the market radio and the meeting room) 
to conduct his campaign and had threatened to remove him from the SGMP after the elec-
tions. In any case, one of Gbadamassi’s election promises was that he would reduce the 
rents for the market shops and stalls. It would appear, in fact, that after the elections he 
entered into discreet negotiations with Moutari to come to an arrangement, but when an 
arrangement had already been reached (according to Moutari), suddenly changed tactics 
and went public. At the Municipal Council session of 30 July 2003, he argued that the 
shop-owners needed to be relieved of the “intolerable burden” of high rents, and accused 
the SGMP of being intransigent. A rather stormy debate ensued, with Moutari eventually 
being banned from speaking and voting on the issue. The Municipal Council voted by a 
majority of 21 (with two abstentions) to simply annul the contract with the SGMP. 
Gbadamassi closed the session with the announcement that the police, the gendarmerie 
and “other security forces” would be sent to the premises of SGMP immediately to en-
force the decision (Le Matinal, 31.7.03). A day or two later, he apparently decided to head 
                                                 
54 For a detailed study of this situation, see Imorou 1998/99, for a shorter published version, Imorou 2000. 
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up the “other security forces” in person and take over the premises of SGMP, however 
when his group arrived at the market they were attacked by Moutari’s supporters. 
Gbadamassi and other members of his group were hit and the front window of his car was 
broken before they hastily retreated. 
The two protagonists then decided to take the matter to court, Gbadamassi accus-
ing Moutari and others of assault and Moutari, in turn, accusing the municipality of 
unlawful breach of contract. Legally, Moutari won on both accounts. On 11 September, 
he and most of the other accused were acquitted (one person was given a suspended 
prison sentence of 11 days and a fine of FCFA 20,000, around € 30). The court later also 
declared the Municipal Council’s cancellation of the management contract unlawful. 
However, Moutari would have no opportunity to enjoy his victory; soon after the first 
verdict he fell ill and had to be moved to Paris where he died on the 25 September (2003). 
On reporting this event to me, a native of Parakou commented: “No death in Africa is 
ever natural”. In other words, just as he had proven too strong for Batoko, Baba Moussa 
and Yacoubou, Gbadamassi had also proven too strong for Moutari. It could be said that 
his strength lay in his capacity to muster and combine weapons of different kinds so that 
when he failed in one battle, for example negotiation, he simply switched to another ap-
proach, e.g. showing up in force or taking his opponent to court, until he finally prevailed. 
This, at least, is how people who were close to Moutari saw it, and how they defined the 
responsibility for Moutari’s death. In an open letter, of which copies were forwarded to 
the Prefect, the public prosecutor and the local heads of police and gendarmerie, they 
forbade Gbadamassi or anybody from his group to attend Moutari’s funeral “in the inter-
est of the peace and tranquillity of Parakou” – a phrase containing a veiled threat of 
physical violence which nobody in Parakou would have any difficulty in deciphering (Le 
Matinal, 3.10.03) 
“Vote for me because I have friends abroad willing to help this city”: The decentralisa-
tion of rent-seeking 
As already pointed out, one of the main ideas behind the introduction of decentralization 
was that by bringing government closer to the people, local resources for development 
would be mobilized more easily. It was assumed that a democratically elected municipal 
council would have greater legitimacy when it came to taxing the local economy than a 
distant government in the capital. 
However, this notion of the need to mobilize local resources was notably absent 
from the election campaign. Indeed, only one candidate, Batoko, bothered to present a 
local development programme at all (see footnote 22). On closer inspection this turned 
out to be a reprint – under the auspices of FARD-Alafia – of the conclusions of a seminar 
held back in 1997, which was organized jointly by Batoko’s own NGO (at a time when he 
was minister for the Civil Service) and that of a political friend of his and financed by 
French development co-operation. Entitled “Our Priorities for Parakou”, the “plan” con-
tained a long list of desirable actions to be carried out in the city (e.g. “find an intelligent 
and pragmatic solution to the reconciliation of Qur’anic and modern schools”). The plan 
did not specify any priorities or estimated costs. Batoko occasionally made very general 
references to the programme in his speeches and it can safely be assumed that its contents 
remained unknown to most voters (while it was given to foreign visitors). 
More frequent references were made in his speeches to rich but unnamed friends 
abroad who were willing to “help” Parakou, provided the electorate was intelligent 
enough to vote for the right persons. In fact, all of the major candidates constantly made 
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vague allusions of this kind to their contacts and connections. In all cases, no names were 
ever specified and the implication was always that the generosity of the foreign benefac-
tor was closely linked to a particular person being elected mayor; otherwise the mysteri-
ous foreigner would keep his wallet firmly closed.55 In other words, local democracy was 
presented by Parakou’s politicians not as a condition for more intensive local resource 
mobilization (as we have seen, Gbadamassi even promised the reduction of municipal 
fees), but for rent-seeking in the development world. Thus, the electorate was encouraged 
to vote for the politicians who claimed to have the most substantial address book. 
This theme of rent-seeking also figured prominently in the publicized actions of 
the elected mayor after February 2003. During the first few months after Gbadamassi’s 
election, a number of articles appeared in the local press expressing some scepticism as 
regards the new mayor’s capabilities in the area of “international relations”. Gbadamassi’s 
opponents were clearly behind these articles. They stressed that compared to the mayors 
of the other major cities Gbadamassi cut a “pitiful figure” and represented a “local dis-
grace” (focus afrique 2002, 5.6.2003) – an obvious reference to his low level of education 
and lack of international experience – and that the team surrounding him consisted of 
“miniature intellectuals” (intellectuels buriburi). However, the mayor refused to allow 
himself to be disturbed by any of this. Soon after his election he began an intensive tour 
of Europe, and France, in particular. (He travelled to Orleans, which is twinned with 
Parakou, and also paid several visits to Toulouse, Lyon and other French cities). He also 
went to the Netherlands and Denmark (on the invitation of a group of young parliamen-
tarians). On 5 June 2003, the Municipal Council declared itself satisfied with the “abun-
dant harvest” (moisson fructueuse) produced by the trip and at the time there were reports 
in the press concerning the launch of a programme for the reconstruction of Parakou’s 
urban roads to be financed by the World Bank and a loan from the African Development 
Bank for the improvement of the city’s electricity supply. Although these programmes 
had been agreed long before the new Municipal Council took office, they were presented 
by Gbadamassi as “his” projects for the city and even more so as a close political link 
with the President of the WADB, Yaya Boni who comes from Parakou, was attributed to 
him.56 The Association Nationale des Communes du Bénin/ANCB (National Association 
of Municipalities of Benin) was established in November 2003 and Gbadamassi elected as 
its chairman.57 This also gave him new opportunities for travel, particularly to France, 
from whence he returned inter alia with a partnership agreement between the University 
of Toulouse and the newly-established University of Parakou (Le Matinal, various is-
sues). 
At the same time, public criticism of Gbadamassi shifted to a different area, that of 
his management of the city. The first whisperings to the effect that the Mayor’s numerous 
trips had yet to translate into any concrete flow of resources were heard in autumn 2003 
(Le Matinal, 5.11.03). The city’s tax revenue was not increasing either: the only local tax 
that had been introduced was a levy on véhicules et bétail en transit, i.e. a tax which pro-
tected the resources of the city’s residents at the expense of non-native merchants (Le 
Matinal, 5.6.2003). As opposed to this, the city administration’s ongoing spending had 
                                                 
55 After the elections, Batoko became somewhat more specific and claimed that Tokyo would have been 
prepared to enter a twinning arrangement with Parakou if he had been elected. Cf. La Montagne no. 30, 
27.3.04. 
56 Yaya Boni is viewed in Benin as a possible successor to Kérékou. 
57 This appointment is less surprising than some of my Beninese interviewees may have thought. The UBF 
holds the majority in the ANCB and Parakou is the largest city in the country in which the Mayor belongs to 
the UBF. 
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increased considerably: there were now three additional deputy mayors, three chefs 
d’arrondissements and 18 additional municipal councillors whose financial needs had to 
be met.58 To these were added a series of conseillers spéciaux, nominated by the Mayor in 
payment of political obligations, including Moise Kérékou, the son of the country’s presi-
dent, who was appointed conseiller spécial pour les affaires du Moyen-Orient (!).59 No 
progress was made in the establishment of the urban development plan and in late 2003 
rumours were circulating to the effect that due to a negative evaluation Parakou was being 
threatened with suspension from the “Decentralized Urban Management Project” which is 
financed by the World Bank (Le Matinal, 5.6.03).60 
5. Conclusions: The Localization of Democracy 
This paper is about the successful local appropriation of a global technology: multi-party 
democracy. The case presented here centres on the municipal elections in Parakou, Benin, 
in late 2002/early 2003, with occasional comparative glances at the local elections in the 
country’s other major cities and at Benin's parliamentary elections which were staged a 
few months later (March 2003). 
The appropriation of multi-party democracy in Benin can be deemed to have been 
successful on a number of counts. Starting with the technical and organizational level, it 
should be stressed what a tremendous organizational challenge the holding of elections 
poses for any government, and particularly an African one. Even if the considerable fi-
nancial burden occasioned by an election is largely alleviated with the help of donors ea-
ger to promote democracy, it is no mean feat for the government of a poor country with a 
rudimentary communications network and an administration that functions at a far from 
optimum level to organize a chain of procedures to take place within the short span of 
twelve hours at several thousand locations scattered throughout a national territory almost 
half as large as Germany and all that this entails in terms of logistical preparation and 
administrative control.61 Add to this the challenges of the vote counting procedures, the 
                                                 
58 The municipal councillors are not paid salaries but they are entitled to expenses. It was known that the 
city administration provided all councillors with a mobile telephone, that the latter had demanded life insur-
ance to the total sum of FCFA 320 million (ca. € 488.000) (substantiating this claim by referring to deputies 
in the national parliament) and that several new four-wheel-drive service vehicles had been acquired (total 
cost FCFA 100,000, ca. € 152,448). One official at the city administration commented ironically: “we now 
have a heavyweight team”, a clearly intentionally ambiguous comment which could be interpreted as mean-
ing that the new team represented a heavy burden on the city’s budget. 
59 Together with Issa Salifou (elected first mayor of Malanville, then MP, Eustache Akpovi, Rachidi 
Gbadamassi, Moise Kérékou belongs to the « collectif des jeunes pour une rélève de qualité ». All of them 
were elected MPs in March 2003. Just before the parliamentary elections, the group disowned Lazare 
Séhouéto, holder of a Ph.D. in anthropology from Germany and Minister of Economy and Commerce who 
had, until then, been considered as their representative in government. However, Séhoueto’s party (Force 
Clé) did very well in attacking the RB party in their own fief around Abomey (where they gained 5 seats), 
and he was appointed to the more important post of Minister of Rural Development, while Eustache Akpovi 
became vice-president of the National Assembly. 
 
60 In terms of the current status of our research, it is not possible to distinguish the factual content from the 
political motivation of the critics in question. It is significant, however, that in late 2003 this criticism no 
longer appeared to come from Gbadamassi’s old opponents, but that it had been adopted by the 
ALKAWALI association, which had been a major cornerstone of Gbadamassi’s electoral success. Cf. press 
declaration by the chairman of ALKAWALI of 26.10.03, reported in Le Matinal 4.11.03. 
61 I have no figures on the numbers of polling stations in Benin. In the Malian parliamentary elections of 
1997, in which I participated as an election observer, there were around 10,000 stations throughout the 
country (for some 5.5 million voters) compared to around 20,000 in a country like the United Kingdom 
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transmission of results first to a departmental and then national collection point, the pro-
cedures for checking and validating the figures, the routines of dealing with irregularities 
and complaints etc. and we can clearly gauge to which extent the Beninese government 
and administration have become old hands at democracy.  
There are many indications that the population has also internalized democracy to 
a significant extent: the animated mood of the election campaigns, the high level of in-
formation about the issues and personalities at stake demonstrated by a large part of the 
electorate (my guess is that more Beninese voters knew the names of more top candidates 
in their localities than would be the case in a municipal election in Germany), the high 
voter turnout which would be the envy of many older democracies, the near absence of 
electoral violence and organized fraud and, last but not least, the facts that more or less 
everybody accepted the results and that the democratically elected institutions were able 
to commence their work as planned. 
Thus, in the case of Benin it is possible to refer with confidence to a relatively 
successful appropriation of democratic procedures. However, appropriation in this context 
does not mean the straightforward adoption of procedures and institutions, it also involves 
their transformation. The case analyzed above also involves transformation in the course 
of appropriation. On the one hand, the elements of local democracy are integrated into an 
existing national style of politics and the local elections in Benin largely maintained in 
unaltered form the existing political geography (with initially three and today four politi-
cally relevant regions), whose basic characteristics have existed since the 1950s. In the 
short term, at least, the introduction of local democracy does not mean the emergence of a 
corrective for the extreme rent-orientation of the Beninese economy and politics; instead, 
it means the decentralization of rent-seeking. Another characteristic feature of Beninese 
politics, i.e. the prevalence of negotiation, was also barely rectified as a result of the in-
troduction of election procedures. Indeed, decentralization actually extended the scope for 
negotiation available to Benin’s politicians as it created a new space for manoeuvre be-
tween the national and municipal levels. The dominance of the national level over the 
local level was only neutralized to a limited extent: in the big cities, the support of the 
national level (on which the municipal elections were viewed as a test run for the subse-
quent parliamentary elections) was crucial to political success, in particular also for the 
political newcomers.  
As expected, local politics is also personalized to a significant extent despite the 
party-based electoral system whereby only parties or electoral lists are admitted at the 
ballot. The fact that, all in all, the so-called “traditional leaders” only played a limited role 
in the elections also reflects a typical characteristic of politics in Benin (where the colo-
nial cantons were abolished as early as 1959), which distinguishes the country from its 
neighbours. And the fact that the political conflicts largely presented as an intergenera-
tional conflict also corresponds to a familiar pattern in Beninese politics which extends 
back to the late colonial era and probably even earlier. Thus, the two main cleavages of 
Beninese politics, i.e. regionalism and “generationalism”, were updated once again in the 
course of the municipal elections. 
On the other hand, however, the introduction of democracy at local level also 
unleashed a certain transformative force in relation to the Beninese polity, the long-term 
effects of which cannot at present be estimated. The local elections continued and rein-
                                                                                                                                                  
which is smaller in size, has a far better developed road and communications network and is immensely 
richer. 
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forced a trend towards political micro-regionalisms. This trend first emerged with the 
transformation of the Dahoman three-region/three-party system to a four/four configura-
tion after 1991, and continued with the complexification of regionalism, whereby regional 
opposition parties form alliances with dominant parties from other regions.  Furthermore, 
the introduction of elected municipal councils generated areas of activity and possibilities 
for advancement for a considerable number (approximately 1000) of junior politicians 
and hence alleviated the generational conflict in part. The most obvious development that 
arose during the municipal elections and was confirmed by the subsequent parliamentary 
elections was, however, the entry of businessmen into the arenas of formal politics. In the 
medium run, this could signify the replacement of a long-established model for political-
social success with roots in the colonial era, i.e. that of the haut cadres, by a new model, 
i.e. that of the businessmen who achieved success in Benin’s post-colonial rent economy. 
It is not possible to predict, however, whether this means that a new version of the rela-
tionship between politics and economics has become established in Benin and will prevail 
in the long term. What is certain, however, is that Benin has undergone a development 
that has long been identifiable in other, in particular Anglophone, parts of Africa. 
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UBF3 FARD-Alafia ASSIRI RB Other parties 
and lists 
I (11 seats) 56.148 
/31.286 
1st round : 78,6% 
 
(24,602 v. cast, 
















  2nd round : 63.8%
 
(19,974 v. cast, 





















II (8 seats) 39.108 
/22.638 
1er round: 79.1% 
  
(17,914 v. cast, 





















III (6 seats) 32.091 
/17.715 
1st round: 75.7% 
 
(13,415 v. cast 
















  2nd round: 52.3% 
 
(9,275 v. cast, 














Total Parakou4 127.347 
/71.639 
55,931 v.  cast, 











Seats obtained   16 4 3 2 --- 
                                                
1 Sources : 1str round: Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome (CENA) ; 2nd round of  1er arrondissement : Commission Électorale Locale de Parakou (CEL) (not yet 
validated by CENA) ; 2nd round of 3e arrondissement : Journal La Montagne no. 14 du 23.1.2003 
2 v. cast = votes cast; valid v. = valid votes. 
3 Percentages are calculated on the basis of total votes cast. 
4 results of 1st round 
Annexe : Profil sociologique des membres du conseil municipal de Parakou, 20031 
 
 
No Nom Arr2 Fonction 
dans le CM 
Formation 
politique 














I --- UBF ~40 f entrepreneur 
(boulangerie) 
Dendi nouveau CAR-Dunyia appart. à une 
« grande fa-
mille » de Pkou 
(Abdoulaye Is-
sa) ; ex-femme 




I chef 1er  arr. UBF ~35 m entrepreneur 
(transport, im-












I 3e adjoint au 
maire 
UBF 55 m journaliste à 
Radio Parakou 
à la retraite 
Ditamari nouveau PRPB, CAR 
Dunya, IPD 
venu et resté à 
Parakou par le 




I mem. de la 
comm. 
d’attribution 
UBF  m chauffeur de 
camion 
Bariba nouveau  réseau des 
chargeurs des 
camions au port 
                                                     
1 Sources : Statistiques de la Commission Electorale Locale (CEL) de Parakou (pour la colonne 2, 3, 4 et 6) et enquêtes personnelles. Je remercie en particulier Agnes Badou, 
Galilou Abdoulaye et Nassirou Bako-Arifari pour leur assistance. 
2 Arrondissement 
3 Dans la plupart des cas, il s’agit de l’age approximatif. 
4 « Comité des Jeunes pour une relève de qualité », formation soutenant le président Kérékou lors des élections présidentielles de 2001, présidé par Saliou Isssa Salifou, 
maire de Malanville et élu (comme R. Gbadamassi) député le 30 mars 2003. 
des marchés de Cotonou 






UBF ~50 m soudeur Nagot nouveau CAP Suru  
6 Nassirou 
ABDOULAYE 
I président de 
la commis-
sion du suivi 
des projets 





ba (se dit 
Dendi) 














~50 m haut cadre (dir. 
gén. OBSS), 
nommé mini-
stre après la 
démission de 
Batoko 
Dendi nouveau  fils aîné de Ma-
ma AROUNA, 
ancien maire de 
Pkou et ministre 
8 Moutari 
AMADOU 











nouveau  mort 25 sep-
tembre 2003 
9 Michel Lolo 
CHIDIAC 
I prés. comm. 
loisirs et 
sport 
ASSIRI ~70 m entrepreneur Dendi (p : 
Libanais, m : 
Bariba) 
ancien PNDD big man de la 
politique natio-
nale et locale 
depuis 1960 




RB ~ 52 m électricien-
formateur à la 
COTEB 







RB ~45 m vitrier Fon nouveau RB chef quartier 
Albarika, réside. 






54 m Administrateur 
civil, ministre 





ancien FARD/PRPB fils de Moham-
med Batoko, 
ancien maire de 
Pkou ; militant 
du FACEEN 
dans les années 
1960, proche du 
président Kéré-
kou dépuis le 
















nouveau FARD président assoc. 
développement 
(TEMBI, élu en 

















16 Assouma Ya- II --- UBF 54 m haut cadre Dendi ancien FARD- dit « de 











« Al Hadj Vi-
ta ») 




m entrepreneur Dendi & 
Hausa 
ancien PNDD, PSD big man local, 
“roi” des Hausa 
au Bénin, semi-
lettré 
18  Samou 
SEIDOU 
ADAMBI 






merce et de 
l’Industrie de 
Pkou 
Dendi nouveau UDFP, 
FARD-Alafia
études univers.; 







II mem. comm. 
affaires 
domaniales 
UBF 53 f aide-soignante 
à la retraite 
Ditammari nouveau IPD  




 m entrepreneur 
(transporteur) 
Bariba nouveau  trésorier du co-
mité de gestion 
de la mosquée 
de Zongo 





ASSIRI  m ?  ancien FARD ancien maire de 
l’ancienne 2e 
commune 




comm. aff.  





UBF ~50 m enseignant, 
ancien direc-
teur de collège 




III 2e adjoint au 
maire 
UBF ~50 m cadre (ad-
ministrateur 
Hausa (p) & 
Bariba (m) 
ancien PRPB, PND, 
PNDD-Bani, 
Ancien chef du 
service voirie 




chef CUP dans 




III chef du 3e 
arr. 
UBF 37 m ménusier Bariba (p) & 
Nagot (m) 
nouveau FARD ?  
25 Mamam 
BAKARI 
III pdt. comm. 
aff. doma-
niales 
UBF 54 m retraité OCBN  nouveau CAR  
 
 
